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I. INTRODUCTION
At the heart of the lawyerly function lies the fee. The fee fixes the
economic relationship between the lawyer and the client, and it deeply in-
fluences the relationship between the lawyer and the justice system. The
fee quite literally supports the lawyer in the professional role. The specific
way in which the attorney fee is structured affects the attorney's obligations
and decision-making at critical junctures in a legal representation. Thus the
fee system by which attorneys are paid is an important and distinguishing
feature of a legal system. Moreover, in the United States and in the western
European countries, the fee system is almost invariably regulated by the
state rather than simply left to the attorney and the client to contract. Thus
it is possible to examine and compare the approaches that the U.S. and the
western European legal systems take to the matter of attorney fees in private
civil cases. Employing an analytical framework drawn from basic agency
theory, we compare the likely effects of the dominant fee systems on the
justice systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the civil law
countries of western Europe. From this analysis, we argue that the various
approaches to fee systems reflect specific differences among western legal
cultures. In addition, we suggest the likely direction of changes in western
fee systems.
The analysis should inform the on-going debates over attorney fee
systems in the United States and in the United Kingdom. Calls for reform
1 The United Kingdom has experienced the throes of civil justice reform throughout the
1990s, beginning with changes in fee structures, changes that will continue into the foresee-
able future. See Part VII, Introduction; Access to Justice with Conditional Fees: A Lord
Chancellor's Department Consultative Paper (Mar., 1998) <http://www.open.gov.uk/
lcd/consult/leg-aid/laconfr.htm > (visited on August 15, 1999) [hereinafter Access to Justice
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of the fee system,2 and especially the contingency fee system, are recurring
features of tort reform proposals in the United States. 4 The United King-
dom is rapidly modifying its approach to paying civil attorneys,' and similar
developments are likely to spread to the continent through competitive pro-
cesses.6 In this changing environment, it is important for policy makers to
understand the advantages and disadvantages, as well as the intended and
unintended consequences, of alternative arrangements. This analysis pro-
vides a basis for predicting these consequences.
Moreover, as the practice of law becomes increasingly global,7 the fee
arrangement will become not only an area that is less immediately tractable
With Conditional Fees]; KPMG Report to the Lord Chancellor on Conditional Fees, (Apr.,
1998) <http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd/lcdseafr.htm> (visited on August 15, 1999) [hereinafter
KPMG Report]; Neil Rose, Council to Vote on Contingency Fees, 95 LAW Soc'Y GAZETTE
16 (April 22, 1998); Lord Mackay, Scheme Reducing Risks for Clients - The Introduction of
the Conditional Fee in England and Wales Should Benefit Clients and Widen Access to Jus-
tice, LAW Soc'Y GAZETTE, July 5, 1995, at 10. See generally, LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE: INTERIM REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN
ENGLAND AND WALES (1995); REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON 'ACCESS TO
JUSTICE' (A.A.S. Zuckerman & Ross Cameron eds.) (1995) [hereinafter REFORM OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE].
2 See Henry J. Reske, Tort Awards Increasing: Experts Peg Rise to Decreased Publicity
About Tort Reform, Profit-Driven Corporate Decision-Making, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 26;
Charles Silver, Incoherence and Irrationality in the Law of Attorneys Fees, 12 REv. LITIG.
301, 307-09 (1993); Gerald Walpin, America's Failing Justice System: Can We Learn From
Other Countries? 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 647, 648 (1997).
3 See, e.g., Allison Aranson, Contingent Fee Systems: Ridicule and Reform From an In-
ternational Perspective. 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 755 (1992); Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics
Real, Making Ethics Work: A Proposal for Contingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 173
(1995); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Practice, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly
of Champions or a Market for Champerty? 71 CHI-KENT L. REv. 625 (1995).
4 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA (1991); Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); NEWT
GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 145-47 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds.
1994) (concerning fee-shifting and damage caps).
5 Access to Justice with Conditional Fees, supra note 1, at §§ 2.6-2.17; Rose, supra note
I, at 16.
6 Marianne Korteweg & Matt Steams, No Cure, No Pay: On the Way, INT'L HERALD
TRIBUNE (THE NETHERLANDER), at 10 (October 18, 1997) ("Despite the criticism, the Dutch
are about to introduce a variant of the controversial no cure, no pay legal system, also known
in the United Kingdom as 'no win, no fee."').
7 Much of the movement toward globalization has been driven by accounting and con-
sulting firms engaging in the practice of law. See John Gibeaut, Squeeze Play, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1998, at 42, 44 ("Today, all the major accounting firms have significant legal practices
throughout Europe with hundreds of lawyers on board. Indeed, in some markets they are
among the largest providers of legal services for businesses."). Globalization is also driven
by GATT's allocation of jurisdiction over professions to the World Trade Organization. Id.;




to national regulation but also a distinctively competitive element of legal
services. Although courtroom representation is inherently national, and
therefore subject to the direct control of local government, many legal
services, such as business planning and litigation support, can be rendered
almost anywhere in the world. Thus, as a practical matter, many clients,
and especially business clients, have choices of fee arrangements beyond
those permitted in the countries in which they are located. This develop-
ment will have far-reaching implications for the legal services industry and
for international clients. Most likely, it will pressure the legal industry, and
the governments that regulate the legal industry, to admit a wider range of
fee systems.
Most analyses of fee systems focus on and criticize a particular fee
system,8 without attending fully to the reality that all fee systems, and cer-
tainly all fee systems in which the civil client contracts to pay the attorney,
share an essential and characteristic flaw. This flaw flows from the nature
of legal services and the attorney's concomitant duty to protect the interests
of the client.9 The financial interest of the attorney and the financial interest
of the client necessarily conflict on the issue of fee setting.' If the client
and the attorney negotiate a fee directly, the divergence of interest is obvi-
INT'L L. 221, 246 (1993) (describing the tenuous relationship between the "Anglo-Saxon
'Big Six"' and the Paris Bar).
8 See, e.g., LESTER BRICKMAN, MICHAEL HOROWITZ, JEFFREY O'CONNELL, RETHINKING
CONTINGENCY FEES (1994); Lester Brickman, Contingency Fees Without Contingencies:
Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark? 37 UCLA L. REv. 29 (1989); Kevin M. Clermont &
John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529 (1978); Stew-
art Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 813 (1989);
Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in
Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970).
9 In common law systems, the attorney-client relationship is a fiduciary relationship. This
conclusion flows from agency law and from the traditional understanding of the legal profes-
sion. See Alison G. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 744 (1978); Brickman, supra note 8, at 32; Arthur Jacob-
son, Capturing Fiduciary Obligation: Shepard's Law of Fiduciaries, 3 CARDOZO L. REV.
519, 524 (1982); Arthur Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and As-
sociation in the Common Law, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 600, 612 (1980). Many issues flow from
the statement that one is a fiduciary. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86
(1943) (Frankfurter, J.) ("[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives di-
rection to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fi-
duciary?"); Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F. 2d 1239, 1241 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing the
attorney as a fiduciary agent).
1o This conflict has been widely observed. See GEOFFREY HAZARD & W. HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODERN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 70-
71 (1985) ("[S]etting... fees for professional services inevitably creates a conflict between
lawyer and client .... A potential conflict of interest attends the commencement of every
client-lawyer relationship .... ") (emphasis in original); Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyers'fees
and the Holy Grail: Where should clients search for value?, 77 JUDICATURE 187, 188 (1994)
("The goal of law firms is to maximize profits, and the goals for corporations is to minimize
costs. The dilemma is how to manage the inherent conflict.").
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ous." If the fee is regulated or fixed exogenously, as for example a juris-
diction where a fee scale is set by the Bar' or by statute and/or the govern-
ment,'3 then the profession's fundamental conflict with its clients is
resolved in the process of fixing the fee scale. In either event, the attorney's
interest in establishing a right to be paid necessarily will collide with the
attorney's duty to represent the interests of the client. This fundamental
dynamic, which undergirds the attorney-client relationship, is unavoidable
and is managed on a systematic basis by the legal system, 14 by the profes-
sion,15 as well as on an individual basis by the attorney and, often, by the
" In the United States it is the norm for the private civil client to assume responsibility
for paying the attorney directly. However, under various statutory schemes, and usually in
class action suits, the plaintiff's attorney fees are awarded directly by a court, to be paid by
the other party, in a manner specified by statute or court rule. See Bradley L. Smith, Three
Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their Impact on Settlement Incentives,
90 MICH. L. REV. 2154, 2156 (1992). See, e.g., M. Wade Baughman, Note, Reasonable At-
torneys' Fees Under the Social Security Act: The Case for Contingency Agreements, 97 U.
ILL. L. REV. 253, 258 (1997). This structure further complicates the relationship between at-
torney and client with respect to fees. For simplicity's sake, in discussing U.S. law, we look
primarily at fact situations in which the fee arrangement is made between the attorney and
the client by contract. The matter is somewhat more complicated in the European legal sys-
tems because of the existence of public legal aid and private legal insurance. See infra Part
IV; Neil Rickman & Alastair Gray, The Role of Legal Expenses Insurance in Securing Ac-
cess to the Market for Legal Services, in REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, 305,
321-22.
12 See infra Part VIII.B.3 (discussing the European experience); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 758-88 (1975) (explaining the U.S. experience with bar-set mini-
mum fees).
13 See infra Part VIII.B.2. The United Kingdom is likely to create fixed fees for small
civil cases. LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES 20-58 (1996).
14 The judiciary has an inherent power to regulate counsel fees in matters before common
law courts. See F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 43 (1964); Ste-
phen F. Gladstone, Judicial Power Over Contingent Fee Contracts: Reasonableness and
Ethics, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 523, 541 (1980).
1- Since 1908 the organized bar has promulgated rules of ethics at the national level. The
most recent version of these rules was promulgated in 1983 as the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct by the American Bar Association (ABA). These rules are adopted, some-
times with modifications, by state bars and the federal courts, which regulate the practice of
law within their jurisdictions. Not surprisingly, the professional rules address issues associ-
ated with the fee arrangement. These issues include the reasonableness of the fee, communi-
cation with the client about the fee, contingency fees, and division of fees.
Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules deals with fee arrangements. Under Rule 1.5 the attorney has
an overarching obligation to charge a reasonable fee. The rule states: "A lawyer's fee shall
be reasonable." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1983). Rule 1.5 then
expresses the factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the fee. These
include:
(I) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular em-
ployment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
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sophisticated client. 16 The dynamic is exacerbated or ameliorated, however,
by the particular way in which the attorney is compensated, and thus by the
latitude that the parties have in fixing that compensation. The fee arrange-
ment is simply one aspect of the attorney-client relationship that requires
management of a conflict of interest, 17 but it is critical and overarching.
This article develops an analytical framework for viewing the rules on
attorney fee arrangements that have been adopted in the United States 8 and
in major western European countries. 19 In section II the paper explains the
choice of economic agency theory as a starting point for developing this
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5. These criteria provide factors for the
lawyer to consider in formulating and defending a fee, but they provide little direct guidance.
Rule 1.5 contrasts sharply with the approach taken by the ABA's previous ethics code,
the Code of Professional Conduct, which focused on the excessiveness of the fee. Discipli-
nary Rule 2-106(A) requires that the lawyer "shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or
collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee." Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-
20. The drafters of the Model Rules considered this approach insufficiently protective of the
client's interests. See REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON
EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT: MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (198 1). However, in considering what kind of fee would be exces-
sive, the Rules provide that a fee is "clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a
lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is
in excess of a reasonable fee." the perspective of a client or of a member of the public, nota-
bly, is not used. The Model Code continues in use in some states.
36 There are, indeed, highly sophisticated clients. See Cindy Collins, The Price of Doing
Business ... Lawyers Praise and Pillory Insurance Giant AIG, 16 No. 22 OF COUNSEL 6
(December 1-15, 1997); Kritzer, supra note 10, at 187 n.5 (chronicling the development of
corporate general counsels' efforts to monitor outside law firm services). See also Jonathan
Foreman, His Offer: Finish Faster, Earn More, NAT'L L.J., May 11, 1998, at BI (describing
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co as a sophisticated company); Jonathan Foreman, Counsel
Puts Her Stamp on Business, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1998, at BI (describing Pitney Bowes, Inc.
as a sophisticated client); Laurel-Ann Dooley, There's No Dodging Crossfire in His Job,
NAT'L L.J., April 20, 1998, at BI (describing Cable News Network Inc. as a sophisticated
client); Jonathan Foreman, Trading in Skadden for Corporate Life, NAT'L L.J., April 13,
1998, at B 1 (describing The Dun & Bradstreet Corp. as a sophisticated client); Geanne Ro-
senberg, For Legal Matters, He's 'Eveready', NAT'L L. J., March 30, 1998, at BI (describ-
ing Ralston Purina Co. as a sophisticated client); Laurel-Ann Dooley, No Handyman, But He
Nailed His Job, NAT'L L.J., March 23, 1998, at B1 (describing The Home Depot Inc. as a
sophisticated client).
17 See Deborah Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665, 715
(1994) (calling for stronger fiduciary standards).
"S See infra Part VI.
'9 See infra Parts VII & VIII.
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framework. Within the meaning of economic agency, the attorney is a dual
agent, with duties to both the client and the judicial system. In section M
the paper identifies five interests that form the basis for evaluating fee sys-
tems. These interests are derived from applying basic agency theory to the
duties of the attorney as an agent of both the client and the judicial system,
and extracting the more specific aspects of both types of duties.
In sections IV and V the interest analysis is applied to three types of
fee arrangements - the fixed fee, the hourly fee, and the contingency fee.
We select these types of fee arrangements because they represents key dis-
tinct elements, one or more of which seems to be present in any of the fee
systems used in the United States or in western Europe. The key distinct
element of the fixed fee is that the attorney will be paid the amount agreed
upon, without regard to effort or to risk. The key distinct element of the
hourly fee is that the attorney will be compensated based on effort, as
measured by time spent working, without regard to a fixed amount or to
risk. The key distinct element of the contingency fee is that the attorney is
compensated for assuming risk, without regard to an agreed upon amount or
effort expended. By isolating the way these three distinct types of fee ar-
rangements affect interests that are important in all of the western fees sys-
tems, we build a framework for evaluating the many fee arrangements that
utilize and combine these key elements, such as the United Kingdom's new
conditional fee system. This framework avoids the dominant tendency of
the literature to focus on the flaws of a particular fee system in isolation
from its alternatives.
In the remaining sections of the article we use the analytical framework
to identify, and to contrast and compare, the probable impact of different
types of fee arrangements on clients and on the justice systems. These sec-
tions examine the specific rules governing fee systems in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the continental civil law countries. They identify
the implicit policy preferences and trade-offs in the different approaches le-
gal systems take to regulating legal fees. These include, specifically, the
new conditional fee system in the United Kingdom, the issue of anticom-
petitive fee structures in western Europe, and the pervasive problem of ac-
cess to justice in the United States and in western Europe.
This task must be approached with caution because, of course, the at-
torney fee arrangement is only one aspect of a justice system. It would be
an error to claim too much, or too little, about any legal system from an ex-
amination of fee arrangements alone. On the other hand, the fee arrange-
ment lies at the heart of the industry of supplying legal services, and it is
invariably subject to public policy intervention. Thus, systemic attitudes
toward justice and toward legal services may be inferred from the manner in
which fee arrangements are regulated.
Attorney Fee Arrangements
19:272 (1999)
II. AGENCY As A SOURCE OF FACTORS FOR COMPARING FEE SYSTEMS
The framework of analysis flows from a perspective grounded in basic
economic agency theory. Attorney fees have been of keen interest to legal
commentators. 20 The fee has generated a significant body of literature ana-
lyzing fee structures and criticizing specific fee arrangements. Different
critiques reflect different assumptions about the material features of the at-
torney-client relationship. The traditional legal ethics literature,2 1 for exam-
ple, focuses on the public function of the legal profession, the expectation
of the public for the profession, and the role of the profession in the admini-
stration of justice. The equity/faimess literature,22 in contrast, attends to the
perceived fairness of the fee arrangement, the relative power of the client
and attorney in the relationship as it is reflected in the fee arrangement, and
20 See BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 8; Clermont & Currivan, supra note 8; Stephen Ell-
man, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. Rnv. 717, 718 (1987); Robert L. Haig & Steven R.
Caley, What a Fair Fee for a Litigator?, 20 LITIG. 37 (1993); Rhode, supra note 17, at 721;
Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibility and the Bottom Line: The Ethics of Bill-
ing, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 261 (1996); Note, Settling for Less: Applying Law and Economics to
Poor People, 107 HARV. L. REv. 442, 445 (1993) [hereinafter Settling for Less]. For a his-
tory of U.S. legal fee arrangements, see John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American
Rules on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984).
21 See Brickman, supra note 8, at 32 (advocating restrictions on the use of contingency
fees); Ellman, supra note 20, at 718; Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Law-
yering, 19 HOFsTRA L. REv. 311 (1990); Eric M. Rhein, Judicial Regulation of Contingent
Fee Contracts, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 151, 153 (1982) (seeking to restrict use of the contingent
fee to circumstances in which the plaintiff cannot afford an hourly fee arrangement); Rhode,
supra note 17, at 721; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN.
L. REv. 589, 597 (1985); Richmond, supra note 20, at 261-62. The traditional legal ethics
literature focuses on the public function of the legal profession, the expectations of the pub-
lic for the profession, and the role of the profession in the administration of justice. In par-
ticular, the legal profession attributes deontological status to the fiduciary duty. See, e.g.,
Brickman, supra note 8, at 44 ("Fiduciary law is the starting point in any analysis of ethical
considerations.") It is a defining reality of the legal profession that lawyers identify with and
protect the interests of clients; it is a reality that creates economic value and reputation as
well.22 E.g., Penelope Eileen Bryan, Toward Deconstructing the Deconstruction of Lawyers,
71 DENY. U.L. REv. 161 (1993); Haig & Caley, supra note 20; Lisa G. Lerman, Gross Prof-
its? Questions About Lawyer Billing Practices, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 645 (1994) [hereinafter
Gross Profits]; Lisa G. Lerman, Contingent Fees: Do Lawyers Deserve Them When Cases
Settle Quickly?, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 45 [hereinafter Contingent Fees]; Leubsdorf, supra
note 20; Darlene Ricker, Greed, Ignorance and Overbilling, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 62;
William G Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1991);
Carl M. Selinger, Inventing Billable Hours: Contract v. Fairness in Charging Attorney's
Fees, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 671 (1994). While closely related to traditional concepts of law-
yer ethics, the equity literature tends to focus on the broader role of the legal system in soci-
ety rather than on the rules of professional conduct and the self-governing nature of the
profession. See generally, Bryan, supra; John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attor-
ney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981).
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the social implications of that relationship. 23 The law and economics litera-
ture24 includes analyses using theories of moral hazard,25 of information
asymmetry,26 and of agency,27 as well as combinations of these theories. We
think that basic agency theory provides a useful and rich exposition of at-
torney fee arrangements, for several reasons.
First, agency theory attends to the way in which the fee structure aligns
the interest of the client and the attorney. It treats the attorney-client rela-
tionship as a special case of the more generalized agency problem an eco-
23 The controversy over the role of attorney fees in recent U.S. tobacco litigation aptly
illustrates the reality that the public interest is perceived to be at stake in the fee setting sys-
tem. See, e.g., Matthew Scully, Will Lawyers' Greed Sink the Tobacco Settlement? WALL ST.
J., February 10, 1998, at Al8.
24 See, e.g., Clermont & Currivan, supra note 8; Patricia M. Danzon, Contingent Fees for
Personal Injury Litigation, 14 BELL J. ECON. 213 (1983); Herbert Kritzer et al., Fee Ar-
rangements and Fee Shifting: Lessons from the Experience in Ontario, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 125 (1984); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Contingent Fees for Lawyers:
The Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 381 (1991); Daniel L.
Rubinfeld & Suzanne Scotchmer, Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis, 24
RAND J. ECON. 343 (1993); Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 8; Settling for Less, supra note
20.
25 The moral hazard literature attends to the incentive structure each potential fee ar-
rangement provides for attorney shirking, or otherwise failing to maximize the interest of the
client. The contingent fee is thought to ameliorate, to some extent, the attorney moral haz-
ard; the hourly fee and the fixed fee are thought (in the absence of effective monitoring) to
be fraught with it. See generally, Clermont & Currivan, supra note 8, at 539; Danzon, supra
note 24, at 216; D.J. Halpern & S.M. Tumbull, Legal Fees Contracts and Alternative Cost
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 3 INT'L REV. L. ECON. 3, 6 (1983); Kritzer et al., supra note
24, at 128; Miceli & Segerson, supra note 24, at 385; Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 8, at
1151.26 See James D. Dana & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of
Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349 (1993); Rubin-
feld & Scotchmer, supra note 24, at 355 ("Contingency fees occur in equilibrium because
there is asymmetric information between attorneys and clients, as well as because attorneys
are subject to moral hazard."). The information asymmetry literature attends to the explana-
tion information economics provides for the existence of a particular fee arrangement "in
nature." See Michael A. Dover, Contingent Percentage Fees: An Economic Analysis, 51 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 531, 545 (1986) (arguing that high contingent fee arrangements reflect insuf-
ficient information in the relevant market).
27 See MAcKINNON, supra note 14, AT 195-206. See generally, Clermont & Currivan, su-
pra note 8; John Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986); Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 503 (1996) (providing a model for identifying the privately optimal contingency fee
for a given case); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 189 (1987); Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Theoretical Implications of
Contingency Legal Fees, 12 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus. 69 (1972); Schwartz & Mitchell, supra




nomic actor faces in conducting business through agents.2' The attorney
acts as an agent for the client-principal, obviously in the legal sense of the
term "agency" but also in the economic sense. In the latter sense, the attor-
ney values the engagement based on the expected return and the cost of
obtaining the return. Agency theory assumes that the attorney accepts the
engagement provided its expected return exceeds the return he can obtain
from employing his efforts in his best alternative activity.29 His interests lie
in maximizing his return at the lowest cost to himself. The client, of course,
usually maximizes his return if the attorney experiences high cost, by in-
vesting time, energy, and perhaps money. In this difference lies an inherent
conflict of their interests. Agency theory invites one to identify predictable
misalignments of interest and consider possible mechanisms for reducing
the misalignment or ameliorating its effects. 0
Consider, for example, the effect of introducing an attorney as an ex-
pert agent. Hiring an attorney both enhances and diffuses the capacity of the
client to effectuate his interest through the legal system. While the attorney
enhances that capacity (or else, one would presume, clients would not hire
attorneys), the attorney also may diffuse or compromise the client's interest.
This may happen in two ways. On the one hand, the attorney may perceive
conflicts between the interests of the client and the interests of the justice
system, and resolve those conflicts against the client. That is, the attorney
may resolve conflicting interests of the client and the legal system by com-
promising the interest of the client. This probably is not troublesome from a
28 Agency is a common law concept. In recent years economists have explicated and
modeled the complex cost and incentive issues associated with agency in contract. See
Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980);
Grossman J. Sanford & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51
ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J.
EcoN. 74 (1979). Business management scholars have augmented the work of economists by
applying agency principles to management studies. See, e.g., Stanley Baiman, Agency Re-
search in Managerial Accounting: A Second Look, 15 ACCT. ORG. & Soc'Y. 341 (1990);
Robert E. Hoskisson & Michael A. Hitt, Antecedents and Performance Outcomes of Diver-
sification: A Review and Critique of Theoretical Perspectives, 16 J. MGMT. 461 (1990); R.
Kosnik & K. Bettenhausen, Agency Theory and the Motivational Effect of Management
Compensation, 17 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 309 (1992); Henry L. Tosi et al., Disaggregating
the Agency Contract: The Effects of Monitoring, Incentive Alignment, and Term in Office on
Agency Decision Making, 40 ACAD. MGMT J. 584 (1997). Recently, legal commentators
have investigated the impact of agency principles on the attorney-client relationship. See
Hay, supra note 27; Miller, supra note 27.
29 In agency theory this condition is known as "participant constraint." The agent (attor-
ney) must obtain more from the proposed activity than from alternative options in order for
the agent to participate. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
36-37 (1988).
30 Clermont & Currivan present a proposal for attorney compensation designed to harmo-
nize the interest of lawyer and client and to reduce the conflict of interest inherent in the two
major compensation plans, the hourly fee, and the contingent fee. Clermont & Currivan, su-
pra note 8, at 533.
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social welfare perspective; in fact, it is considered desirable, to varying ex-
tents, in almost any modem legal system. The client would have obligations
to the justice system even in the absence of an attorney; requiring the attor-
ney to see that the client meets these obligations simply assures that the in-
troduction of a lawyer/agent does not diffuse the basic responsibilities of
the client. For example, the attorney may prevent the client from telling lies
on the witness stand, or he may comply more promptly and fully with a dis-
covery request than the client would prefer.
On the other hand, there is the more ominous risk that the attorney
might use the professional engagement to pursue his own personal interest
rather than that of the client, and at the expense of the client. This is the
classic concern of agency theory.31 In that theory, the fee arrangement is
one mechanism for managing the agency problem.3 2 By aligning the attor-
ney's financial interest with that of the client, the fee arrangement may re-
duce or increase the incentive for the attorney to sacrifice the client's
interests. This includes important interests such as the financial costs of the
engagement and the likelihood of obtaining or paying damages and related
costs.
Secondly, agency theory accommodates the reality that the attorney's
role is inconsistent with a complete alipnment of the attorney and client in-
terests. The attorney is a "dual agent,",3 in the sense that the attorney has a
duty to the justice system and to the larger society as well as to the client.
Obviously, the client has duties to the justice system and to the larger soci-
ety as well, but the attorney's duties are sharply and clearly defined; the at-
torney must explicitly assume these duties in order to practice law. Within
31 Agency theory identifies the conditions for which a rational agent satisfies his obliga-
tions to exert effort on behalf of his principle when that effort is costly to the agent. If the
rational agent's actions are unobservable, then the agent is unlikely to exert sufficient effort
without adequate incentives. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY
578-82 (1990).32 See Fama, supra note 28; Grossman & Hart, supra note 28; Holmstrom, supra note 28;
Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10
BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979).
31 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1983) (describing lawyers as
"trusted agents of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just solution"
(quoting Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); In re Grif-
fiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 n.14 (1973) (describing the "honored and traditional role as an
authorized but independent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a client"). Economists
have examined the dual agency issue. They focus on the difficulty that principals can have in
eliciting optimal effort from an agent when other principals are simultaneously competing
for the agent's attention. See generally, B. Douglas Bemheim & Michael D. Whinston,
Common Agency, 54 ECONOMETRICA 923 (1986); David E. M. Sappington, Incentives in
Principal-Agent Relationships, 5 J. ECON. PERsP. 45 (1991). Thus, we can view litigation as
a situation in which the client and judicial system vie for the attorney's sometimes conflict-




the meaning of economic and organizational agency theory, the attorney is
an agent for the judicial and legal system. Thus, the manner in which the fee
arrangement may affect the attorney's compliance with these duties must be
considered in any analysis of attorney fee systems. With this in mind, our
analysis considers the probable effect of a fee structure on the efficient
working of the justice system, and the likelihood that the system will pro-
duce truthful results in an efficient manner that is respected as fair and just.
While this analysis focuses on the fee, other factors also influence the
attorney's propensity to resolve conflicts that flow from the multiple duties
of the attorney as dual agent. Legal ethics rules place almost deontological
value on meeting duties to the client and to the justice system, and many
attorneys will follow these rules because they believe that is their duty, even
if it is not in the attorney's or the client's obvious and immediate interest.
In addition, the attorney's concern for reputation may reduce the incen-
tive to sacrifice client or social interest to his own benefit, especially to the
extent that his actions are observable. Moreover, attorneys serve as confi-
dential advisors to clients, often in periods of the client's life characterized
by stress and even despair. The demands of professional role responsibility
may induce the attorney to champion the client's interest, even at the ex-
pense of his or her own interest. Thus, ethics rules, concern for reputation,
and the value of faithfulness to duty - and the propensity to act on those
values - may serve to ameliorate the agency problem as well. While these
factors are quite real, and in fact influence attorney behavior, they are not
explicitly included in the analysis in order to keep the analysis focused on
the economic incentives generated by the fee structure and thereby manage-
able. Economic incentives are but one kind of influence on the attorney, but
they are a keenly important influence.
III. THE ANALYTICAL FACTORS
This analysis examines the range of possible fee arrangements from the
standpoint of five factors. The first two flow from the attorney's relation-
ship with the client and the remaining three flow from the attorney's rela-
tionship with the judicial system and the interests of justice.
The first factor is the extent to which the fee arrangement tends to align
the interest of attorney and client in making decisions about the case. It is
common in the literature, both domestic3 4 and internationally comparative,
35
34 See Kritzer, supra note 10, at 188; Clermont & Currivan, supra note 8, at 536 ("In sum,
neither the certain hourly fee nor the contingent percentage fee can align fully the economic
interests of lawyer and client.").3 5 See Loraine Minish, The Contingent Fee A Re-Examinae, 10 MANITOBA L. J. 65, 72
(1979) ("This conflict begins at the very outset, when the contract is being negotiated be-
tween lawyer and client. As a partner in this venture into justice the lawyer is subject to his
own temptations to obtain the best deal for himself."); Access to Justice with Conditional
Fees, supra note 1, at § 1.3 ("The current system does not encourage lawyers - who are paid
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to find various fee arrangements criticized on the ground that the arrange-
ment poses a conflict of interest for the attorney. It is more useful to recog-
nize the natural and inherent conflict of interests that any fee arrangement
poses, and then examine and compare fee arrangements from the standpoint
of whether the conflict of interests is worsened or improved. Presumably, to
the extent that the interests of attorney and client are aligned, the attorney
has increased incentive to act in the interest of the client.
A second factor is the risk of financial loss or gain from the outcome
of the case; these risks, and their associated costs, may fall on the client or
the attorney, or be shared by them, depending on the fee structure. Both cli-
ents and attorneys vary in their propensity to accept or avoid risk, and dif-
ferent justice systems vary in their willingness to permit clients to shift risk
to attorneys. Clients employ lawyers in order to avoid or reduce the risk of
loss or the magnitude of loss if it occurs as a result of a legal conflict. To
the extent that the fee arrangement tends to limit the client's costs and risk
in the legal system, the client's basic interest in engaging an attorney is ad-
vanced. Cost shifting and risk shifting, of course, may impose other costs
on the client, and our analysis seeks to identify these costs.
A third factor is access to the judicial system, an interest that the client
undoubtedly regards as important, but which is also regarded as important
or desirable, to varying extents, in western justice systems.3 6 The client en-
gages an attorney in order to gain access to the judicial system. 37 To the
extent that a fee arrangement tends to improve the client's access to the ju-
dicial system, it promotes the client welfare and interest. It follows that a
system that promotes one client's welfare also tends to promote the welfare
of all other similarly situated potential clients.38 Thus, improving or dimin-
ishing access to the judicial system presumably improves or diminishes so-
cial welfare as well.
the same, win, lose or draw - to weed out weak cases. This means that too many people un-
dergo the strain of lengthy legal disputes for nothing.").
36 See Access to Justice with Conditional Fees, supra note 1, at § 1.1 ("Justice should be
there for all or us, when we need it. It should not be just for the wealthy or those on the very
lowest incomes."), § 1.9 ("Access to justice is.. .a fundamental part of our democracy.");
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."). However, this right to counsel has been
extended only to a limited number of civil cases, primarily those involving the risk of gov-
ernment intrusion on family relationships. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996).
37 See Access to Justice with Conditional Fees, supra note 1, at § 1.13 ("Our aim is a fair
and open legal system, where everyone is able to rely on the impartial advice of their legal
advisers throughout the legal process").38 See, e.g., J.A. Jolowicz, The Woolf Report and the Adversary System, 15 Civ. JusT. Q.
198, 199 (1996) (quoting Lord Diplock on the need for the state to provide its citizens with
"a constitutional right of access in the role of plaintiff to obtain the remedy to which he
claims to be entitled in consequence of an alleged breach of his legal or equitable rights by
some citizen, the defendant.")
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A fourth factor is the extent to which different fee arrangements affect
the operational efficiency39 of the justice system. While the operational effi-
ciency of the justice system is not the immediate and primary concern of
any particular client, it is of keen concern to clients as a group and to the
larger society.40 This factor may be observed in the incentives to settle or to
continue a case, and in the working out of conflicts between the attorney's
interests and his duty to court or to client . We also consider the possible
impact of the fee arrangement on the revelation of truth and incentives that
different fee structures may provide for the attorney to introduce error in ju-
dicial decision-making.
Finally, we consider the way in which the fee arrangement may affect
the social perception of fairness in the justice system. We assume that if, for
example, a plaintiffs return substantially exceeds the value of his injuries,
or an attorney's return substantially exceeds the value of her effort, observ-
ers will perceive a windfall, an unjust enrichment,42 and will resent it. This
resentment, described by equity theory,43 increases in the degree that the
plaintiffs or attorney's gain is perceived to be unjust or unfair. This reduces
social confidence in the judicial system.
39 We use the term "operational efficiency" broadly, to refer to the manner in which the
justice system achieves its objectives of finding truth and doing justice. Attorney fee systems
that provided incentives for introducing error into fact finding or that wasted judicial re-
sources with delays and frivolous cases would, for example, affect the operational efficiency
of the system.4 0 See GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL 5, 14-15 (1980) (arguing that society has a
strong interest in minimizing all litigation costs and maximizing decision accuracy); Frank
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of
Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309, 353 (1981) (asserting that courts promote efficiency
by accurately enforcing laws, contracts and socially determined rights and liabilities); Daniel
L. Rubinfeld & David E. M. Sappington, EJffcient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judi-
cial Proceedings, 18 RAND J. ECON. 308, 308-09 (1987).
41 See infra pp. 26-30 and text accompanying notes 47, 59.
42 Avoidance of a "windfall" to an attorney often is mentioned in judicial discussions as
an element of the "reasonableness" of attorney fees. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 893-94 (1984). The contingent fee arrangement in particular is criticized for its unjust
enrichment potential. See Dover, supra note 26, at 551. The lack of correlation between
hours worked and fee paid creates much of the problem. See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra
note 8, at 1126. The fact that a contingent fee attorney can receive a substantial fee for little
apparent effort is frequently denounced, and courts have punished attorneys for accepting fee
awards believed to be excessive. See, e.g., In re Swartz, 689 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. 1984) (sus-
pending an attorney for receiving a $50,000 fee after insurance company agreed to pay the
full policy limit before the attorney filed a complaint); People v. Nutt, 696 P.2d 242 (Colo.
1984) (suspending an attorney for a contract that allowed payment of $200,000 for services
valued at less than $19,000).43 See generally, ELAINE WALSTER ET AL., EQuiTY: THEORY AND RESEARCH (1978).
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF FEE ARRANGEMENTS
This section considers three types of fee arrangements and examines
the likely behavioral incentives under each arrangement, as they affect the
five interests identified in the Section III. It considers the fixed fee ar-
rangement, the hourly fee arrangement, and the contingency fee arrange-
ment. Logically, there is a much wider variety of ways in which an attorney
could be paid. Those found in the United States or in western Europe 4 in-
volve one or more of the key distinct elements of each type of fee arrange-
ment - the element of fixedness or predictability in the case of the fixed
fee, the element of effort (as measured by time) in the case of the hourly
fee, and the element of risk of loss in the case of the contingency fee. These
elements represent the basic components of fee structures found in the U.S.
and western European legal systems. We examine each type of fee ar-
rangement from the standpoint of its effect on 1) alignment of the interests
of client and attorney; 2) allocation of costs and the risk of loss; 3) access to
justice; 4) the operational efficiency of the justice system; and 5) the social
perception of fairness.
A. The Fixed Fee
In the fixed fee arrangement, the client and the attorney contract for a
fixed payment for handling the engagement. The attorney earns no greater
or lesser fee for handling the case slowly or expeditiously, skillfully or
carelessly, or for winning or losing. This arrangement provides the client
certain benefits, but it also poses problems for the client and for social wel-
fare. For example, the fixed fee arrangement poorly aligns the interests of
the attorney and the client. It allocates all risk of loss of the case to the cli-
ent, and it discourages access to the justice system. On the positive side,
however, it provides few incentives for the attorney to fail to meet his du-
44 Some commentators have considered the proprietary transfer, or the outright sale of the
client's claim to the attorney. See Coffee, supra note 27, at 670; Danzon, supra note 24, at
223 ("[O]utright sale is unlikely to be optimal since the value of a personal injury claim de-
pends not only on the attorney's effort but also on the behavior or the plaintiff."); Kritzer,
supra note 3, at 308 (suggesting that escrow of a fee would be necessary to secure the cli-
ent's cooperation in pursuing the case); Miller, supra note 27, at 196 (dismissing further
analysis because of the alignment of law and public policy against it, but observing that in an
outright sale of a claim to a lawyer "agency problems would be largely absent"); Rubinfeld
& Scotchmer, supra note 24, at 349 (identifying the "client moral hazard" problem associ-
ated with such a fee system); Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16
J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 329-30 (1987) (arguing for permitting plaintiffs to sell tort claims to
attorneys); Watts, supra note 27. While the western legal systems do not permit this structure
explicitly, its key features can be seen in legal contexts such as debt collection and insurance
subrogation, where the injured party is paid and the real party in interest is the collection
agent or the insurance company. In addition, certain types of U.S. class actions simulate
some key features of such an arrangement.
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ties to the justice system, and his rewards are unlikely to be regarded as un-
fair or unjust.
The fixed fee arrangement misaligns the financial interest of the client
and the attorney, and this may result in suboptimal representation from the
client's vantagepoint. The attorney's return on the case actually decreases
with the time he invests on behalf of his client, giving the attorney an in-
centive for minimizing actions that might actually increase the client's
probability of winning the case. If the attorney is free to negotiate the fee,
the attorney will demand a payment amount that reflects the uncertainty of
the time commitment required by the engagement. If he errs in the estimate,
he may adopt a cost-minimizing approach, or a quick settlement of the case,
which could reduce the client's return or jeopardize the case altogether.
The attorney on the other side can exploit this incentive structure through a
strategy that increases the fixed fee attorney's costs. By credibly threatening
to impose costs, it can pressure the fixed fee attorney into recommending an
unfavorable settlement. Defendants who litigate often may seek a reputation
for over-investing in litigation, making it irrational for a plaintiffs attorney
to accept the case under a fixed fee arrangement.
The misalignment of interests may be seen also in the fixed fee attor-
ney's disincentive to invest more effort as the stakes in the case increase.
The fixed fee attorney may even have an incentive to exert less effort in
higher stakes cases than in lower stakes cases if he knows the defense attor-
ney is paid on the basis of effort or outcome. Hence, the fixed fee attorney
may have a stronger incentive to settle in order to avoid depleting his fee by
trying to counter a strong defense in the high stakes case, whereas the po-
tential loss is lower countering a less motivated defense in a lower stakes
case. This perverse incentive structure is diametrically opposed to the cli-
ent's interests. If the attorney charges more for a high stakes case, he has a
greater loss reserve, but that still provides no incentive to spend more time
on the case.
On the positive side, the fixed fee attorney has other incentives to per-
form well. Psychic benefits, the personal satisfaction of providing adequate
representation, and reputation enhancement all provide such incentive. Ap-
parent success in a highly visible, high stakes case can serve as a proxy for
performance, spreading valuable information to potential clients and
sources of referral. Just as marginal economic benefits rise with the case
value for the defendant, marginal reputation benefits rise with stakes and
visibility for the fixed fee attorney. Hence, the fixed fee attorney may will-
ingly invest in high stakes cases to reap these benefits. Of course, it is in
45 See Sarah Evans Barker, How the Shift From Hourly Rates Will Affect the Justice Sys-
tem, 77 JUDICATURE 201, 202 (1994) ("When continued representation of a client has be-
come economically untenable to the lawyer, or when the client has lost faith in the attorney
before a balloon payment is to be paid to the lawyer, one could expect things to go haywire
in major ways.").
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just such cases that the defendant is also likely to invest heavily. If an in-
vestment race ensues, the fixed fee attorney has a high incentive to settle. In
this event, too, the fixed fee structure fails to align the interest of attorney
and client.
The fixed fee fixes the client's costs and, in many cases, his downside
risk. The client knows the cost of the engagement with certainty. On the
other hand, the attorney does not share downside risk with the client, and
the attorney is paid regardless of the outcome. Thus, the fixed fee arrange-
ment allocates all of the risk of loss of the case to the client and none to the
attorney.
46
The fixed fee arrangement also discourages access to the justice sys-
tem. If the client cannot pay, he cannot obtain relief, regardless of the merits
of the case. In high cost litigation, noncontingent payment of the attorney
may not be practical for any but the wealthiest of potential clients. In rela-
tively low cost cases, however, the client may obtain greater access, since
costs can be ascertained and there is no risk of open-ended liability, as there
might be if the attorney were paid by the hour.
The fixed fee arrangement provides the justice system mixed benefits.
On the one hand, attorneys working under a fixed fee have few incentives to
act unethically, because returns cannot be increased through unethical or
disingenuous behavior. In fact, there is an incentive to be efficient and ex-
peditious in reaching a resolution of the matter.47 On the other hand, the
fixed fee structure provides little incentive to avoid frivolous lawsuits. Pro-
vided the case fee exceeds the expected cost of representation, the fixed fee
attorney has an incentive to take any case with a positive expected return
regardless of the case's merits. However, the rational fixed fee attorney
would be slow to take highly meritorious cases with significant precedent-
setting value if expected litigation costs are too high. One would expect the
mix of cases under a fixed fee structure to include an undesirable ratio of
frivolous claims relative to potential precedent-setting cases.
Finally, since the fixed fee contract is deterministic, there are few risks
to the public perception of fairness in the justice system. It is true that the
fixed fee attorney may receive an apparent unearned bonus if he settles the
case quickly or without investing significant effort or resources, especially
46 Of course, the attorney assumes the risk that the engagement consumes more time and
expense than was estimated when he agreed upon the fee. Making such estimates, of course,
is part of lawyering.
47 Observing that "the core benefit of value billing arrangements is the institution of stan-
dardized, pre-packaged groupings of cases and controversies," Judge Barker suggests that
fixed fee lawyers place an economic premium on "generic, patterned approaches." As a re-
sult, "[I]awyers who lack any real incentive to present their cases in an accurate, customized
fashion, alert and faithful to the uniqueness of each set of facts and to the subtleties in the
application of the law to those facts, will leave the 'heavy lifting' to the courts. And the
courts are not equipped, from the standpoint of time or function, to assume that burden."
Barker, supra note 45, at 202.
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if settlement amount appears to be too low. Although the client may reap an
apparent windfall from unexpectedly large damages, the fixed fee attorney
does not share it. Because he does not share the windfall, he has little in-
centive to press for high damages, so one would expect fewer unexpectedly
high damage awards when plaintiffs attorneys work under fixed fee ar-
rangements. Hence, the deterministic nature of fixed fee arrangements and
the disincentives against excessive case investments are likely to limit the
negative social impact of perceived windfalls.
B. The Hourly Fee
The hourly fee is the most universally accepted fee arrangement. While
it has much to commend it, it too poses serious problems. In the usual
situation, the attorney keeps track of hours worked and bills the client based
on the amount of time expended on the client's behalt. The hourly fee
avoids some of the problems of misaligned interests that the fixed fee
posed, but it presents others. As in the fixed fee arrangement, the risk of
losing the case is allocated to the client. Moreover, the client's risk of loss
is exacerbated by the preference for risk that the fee arrangement engenders
in the attorney. The hourly fee does little to increase access to justice, but it
provides few incentives for the attorney to shirk his duties to the justice
system. Moreover, since compensation varies directly with effort, the
hourly fee system is likely to be regarded as highly fair.
The hourly fee arrangement avoids some of the problems of interest
misalignment of the fixed fee; however, it does so at the financial risk of the
client. On the one hand, the attorney has no incentive to shirk. He can fo-
cus on preparing the highest quality case possible. At its extreme, he can
"leave no stone unturned. ' 49 This incentive is conducive to high quality rep-
resentation. There is evidence that, as compared with contingency fee attor-
neys, hourly fee attorneys appear to focus on the quality of representation,
reputational issues, and providing a public service.'
On the other hand, the hourly fee arrangement may enhance the cli-
ent's costs and risk of financial loss for three reasons. First, the hourly fee
attorney and the client will have different attitudes toward costs, and this
48 See Kritzer, supra note 10, at 188 ("The goal of law firms is to maximize profits, and
the goal of corporations is to minimize costs. The dilemma is how to manage the inherent
conflict.").
49 See Rhode, supra note 21, at 635 ("[M]ost lawyers will prefer to leave no stone un-
turned, provided, of course, they can charge by the stone.").
so See Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 87,
106 (1995) (asserting that hourly fee attorney cost indifference and the requirement for con-
current or advanced payment puts the hourly fee arrangement out of the reach of many liti-
gants); Kritzer et al., supra note 24, at 265-66 (presenting data that suggests that hourly fee
attorneys work diligently in their clients' interests but may be less attuned to costs than are
their clients).
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divergence will elevate the client's risks. The hourly fee attorney's fees are
indeterminate, and he faces zero costs in deciding whether to make an addi-
tional investment. It follows that he will undertake any investment with a
positive expected return, no matter how small.5' Hence, there is endogenous
pressure for the hourly fee attorney to over-prepare and overspend, at the
expense of the client. While the plaintiff can limit costs through diligent
monitoring, the plaintiff is at a disadvantage due to the attorney's superior
legal knowledge. 3 Thus, in an hourly fee case, the attorney has an incentive
to over-prepare, and this is costly to the client54
Second, the hourly fee attorney's attitude toward the risk of losing will
diverge from that of the client. The attorney may expect strong reputational
and psychic benefits from winning, but his downside risk is limited, since
his income is independent of the case outcome. Thus the attorney is likely
to prefer greater risk than the client would prefer. This difference in risk at-
5' The blatant practice of running up hours in a wasteful manner is anticipated and pro-
hibited under U.S. rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) ("A
lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using
wasteful procedures."). See also Selinger, supra note 221, at 671-73; Lerman, Gross Profits,
supra note 22, at 45 (recounting horror stories of hourly-overbilling practices in large law
firms); Ricker, supra note 22, at 62 ("Sixty-hour days, documents that don't exist, clerical
work that fetches $300 an hour. It's not an Alice in Wonderland fantasy, but a peek through
the looking glass into the kaleidoscope world of law firm overbilling.").
52 See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1296 (1978) (discussing how the adversarial
nature of civil litigation and hourly fees provide attorneys with incentives to protract and
complicate discovery); Rhode, supra note 17, at 711 ("In a time-based billing system, strate-
gies that prolong proceedings almost always benefit the lawyer, only sometimes benefit the
client, and even less frequently benefit the public."); id. at 710 ("Experts generally agree that
the hourly [billing] minimums at many firms are unattainable without making 'very liberal
allowances' for the way time is recorded. Similar allowances are often made in assessing cli-
ents' 'needs' and staffing their cases."); Ross, supra note 22; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Cul-
ture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification and
Organization ofLawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 621 (1994).
53 Outside auditors may be retained to examine billing records and evaluate charges. Of
course, these monitors pose their own agency problems. See Robert E. Litan & Steven C.
Salop, Reforming the Lawyer-Client Relationship Through Alternative Billing Methods, 77
JUDICATURE, 191, 192-93 (1994) (discussing monitoring problems).
54 Professor William Ross, for example, reports that in a survey of corporate and private
counsel 12.3% of U.S. private practitioners and 15.2% of U.S. corporate counsel respondents
believe that lawyers "frequently" pad their billable hours beyond the hours they work.
Thirty-eight percent of private, and 40.7% of corporate counsel, believe that lawyers do so
"occasionally." Forty-nine point seven percent of private and 44.1% of corporate say they
believe such padding 'rarely' or 'never' happens. More than half of both groups knew per-
sonally of instances of padding. Ross found that, in addition to ethical restraints, reputation




titudes will translate into different attitudes toward settlement,5 and it can
cause substantial welfare losses for the plaintiff.
5 6
Finally, the incremental payment characteristic of hourly fees obscures
total costs. The plaintiff may be caught in a repeated cycle of escalating in-
vestments. The greater his litigation investment, the more the plaintiff loses
by refusing to continue the case. Ultimately, his losses may substantially
exceed the maximum that he would have risked prior to the start of litiga-
tion.
Hourly fee arrangements probably provide greater access to the judicial
system than fixed fee arrangements, particularly if they do not require pay-
ment in advance. However, the expected cost of litigation is likely to be
greater, for the reasons already discussed. Therefore, plaintiffs with limited
resources may not regard the hourly fee arrangement as an option. Moreo-
ver, the hourly fee attorney may require advance payment of a retainer fee,
eliminating this fee arrangement from the consideration of many potential
plaintiffs. One would expect fewer claims brought if hourly fee arrange-
ments were the only means of obtaining legal representation.
On the other hand, the hourly fee arrangement does little to filter
meritorious claims from nuisance claims. 7 Therefore, if the plaintiff has
strategic motives for bringing a lawsuit and can pay the fees, the hourly fee
attorney has the incentive to take the case, regardless of its merit. Hence,
hourly fee arrangements make it easier for well-funded plaintiffs to use the
judicial system for purposes other than pursuing a valid legal claim, nega-
55 See William C. Cobb, Competitive Pricing Along the Value Curve; or The Folly of
Hourly Rate Pricing, 14 LEGAL ECON., Sept. 1988, at 28; Miller, supra note 27 (exploring
the agency problems of the hourly fee attorney in the settlement context and observing that a
purely self-interested hourly fee attorney never would settle even when settling is in the cli-
ent's best interest); Rhode, supra note 21, at 596.
56 Consider, for example, two cases with identical expected values of $1 million. In the
first case, the plaintiff is awarded either $900,000 or $1,100,000, each with a probability of
.5. In the second case, the plaintiff is awarded either zero or $2 million, each again with a
probability of .5. In the first case, neither plaintiff nor his hourly fee attorney will accept a
settlement of less than $900,000. In the second case, the plaintiff facing an even chance of
walking away with zero may be willing to accept a settlement offer of much less than
$900,000, perhaps even $500,000 or less. The attorney, however, may regard her efforts as
inadequate if she settles so low, a signal of a poor effort, a concern that the client does not
share. If the attorney persuades the client to hold out for a greater settlement, the results
could be disastrous. Note that this example does not consider the effect of costs, which fur-
ther exacerbate the divergence in risk attitude between the client and attorney in an hourly
fee arrangement.
57 Commentators have defined nuisance or frivolous lawsuits as being those in which
plaintiffs have lower probabilities of prevailing than do legitimate plaintiffs in similar cases.
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analy-
sis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397, 404 (1993). The hourly fee attorney, who is paid regardless of who
prevails or the probable outcome of litigation, has no incentive to distinguish between cases
with low and high probabilities of success.
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tively impacting the judicial system and public confidence in that system.5"
Under a "loser pays" rule of the European systems, the threat of a defendant
pressing for full judgment instead of settling ought to ameliorate this effect
to some extent. It would put even greater pressure on the client, who, if he
loses, would have to pay not only the hourly fee that his own attorney has
run up but also that of his adversary, to monitor costs and attend to settle-
ment opportunities.5 9
With the downside risks bounded, the attorney has little incentive to
violate his duties to the justice system. The attorney has a reduced incentive
to engage in questionable behavior to enhance the probability of winning.
He has little incentive to exaggerate the size of damages. This fee arrange-
ment may even encourage attorneys to engage in behavior designed to en-
hance their reputation as principled and skilled attorneys, even at the
expense of the client's interests. They may find that the benefit to "winning
at all costs" is tempered by the drawbacks of a sullied reputation.
Finally, the hourly fee arrangement probably enjoys the greatest per-
ception of fairness of the fee arrangements considered. The hourly fee at-
torney is paid only for services rendered, so that the fee reflects the major
cost component - attorney effort - to a greater extent than the other fee
arrangements. The attorney has a strong incentive to excel, to enhance his
reputation to support higher hourly fee prices, and the least incentive to
shirk. Moreover, since excess costs are not visible to the public, 60 highly
compensated hourly fee attorneys do not appear to receive windfalls that
highly compensated contingency fee attorneys receive. 61 Their excesses
58 Professor Rhode recounts the 12 year delay in the regulation of peanut butter content
that Covington & Burling was able to effect for a client, and "Cravath, Swaine & Moore's 14
year defense of an antitrust case that, according to its chief litigator, involved thousands of
exhibits, a 50,000-page record, and no real dispute about the facts." Rhode supra note 21, at
598. Presumably, both firms were working by the hour.
59 Cf., Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F. 2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1986) ("There is no wholly satis-
factory way to employ hourly rates when the plaintiff can not or will not monitor his own
attorney and the defendant has both incentive and ability to turn the request for fees into a
second major litigation.").
60 Hourly fee attorneys may, however, benefit unjustly from litigation due to their control
over their compensation and the difficulty of monitoring. They may inflate their hours
worked, billing the time spent flying, eating meals, and working on other cases. On occasion,
attorneys have billed in excess of 24 hours in a single day. See, e.g., Houghton v. Sipco, Inc.,
828 F. Supp. 631, 638 (1993) (attorney billed 26.7 hours in a single 24 hour period); Claire
P. Rattigan, Bashing Lawyers: Massachusetts Attorneys Talk About Their Profession's
Reputation and Wonder Whether They Can Do Anything To Help It, MASS. LAW WKLY.,
April 3, 1995, at B1.
61 See Brickman, supra note 8, at n.186 (citing the 1979 DC-10 crash in Chicago in which
at least one contingency fee attorney received $383,244 for 25-35 hours of work); BRICKMAN
ET AL., supra note 8, at n.24 (citing a 1989 Texas school bus accident settlement for which
contingency fee attorneys received more than $40 million for 8 month's work).
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probably do not have a strong detrimental impact on society's perception of
the justice system.62
C. The Contingency Fee
In the United States, where it enjoys the greatest popularity, the con-
tingency fee takes many forms. For purpose of this section, however, we re-
fer to a fee arrangement in which the attorney is not entitled to payment
unless the client wins the case, and the amount of payment depends on the
amount of damages awarded. The chief characteristic of this arrangement is
that the attorney shares both the risks and the benefits of the case. Often this
fee arrangement is called a proportional contingency fee. Although this fee
arrangement has flaws, it has many benefits that accrue primarily to clients.
In particular, the arrangement more closely aligns the financial interest of
the client and the attorney than do the fixed and the hourly fee systems;
nevertheless, the alignment is flawed in important respects. The arrange-
ment allows the client to shift substantial risk of loss and costs to the attor-
ney, and it permits financing that increases access to the justice system.63
62 Nevertheless, negative impact can be identified. See Ross, supra note 22, at 90
("[E]xcessively clever strategies for accumulation of hours and the protection of litigation
for the conscious or unconscious purpose of generating more billable hours have aggravated
a widespread cynicism about the legal professional that ultimately calls into question the in-
tegrity of the judicial system and weakens public faith in the quality of the nation's jus-
tice.").
63 The colorful history of the contingent fee contract in American law is chronicled in
Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contin-
gency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. Rnv. 231, 248 (1998); BRICKMAN ET
AL, supra note 8, at 35-39; Leubsdorf, supra note 22, at 10. The contingency fee's disfavor
has roots in both Roman law and English common law. See MACKINNON, supra note 14, at
9-10; BRICKmAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 35. In the English legal tradition, restrictions on
contingent fees, and on attorney fees more generally, are rooted in the doctrines of mainte-
nance, barratry, and champerty. Maintenance is defined as "[ain officious intermeddling in a
suit which in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or
otherwise, to prosecute it or defend it." BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 860 (5th ed. 1979). Bar-
ratry is "[t]he offense of frequenting, exciting, and stirring up quarrels and suits..." Id. at
137.
The acceptance of contingency fees in the United States was prompted in part by concern
for the ability of economically disadvantaged person to gain access to the courts. See
Leubsdorf, supra note 22, at 475-79. It was the result also of changes, beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century, in social and judicial attitudes toward the legal profession. As the profes-
sion moved from a system of statutorily set fees to a contract model of compensation, the
sharing of risk through contract became more acceptable. See M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN
LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 1776-1876 277 (1976); Brickman, supra note 8, at 35-37.
As a growing body of impecunious industrial workers sought redress for industrial injuries,
the contingency fee became a more common method of financing lawsuits. See LAWRENCE
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 422-23 (2nd ed. 1973); Comment, Are Contingent
Fees Ethical Where Client Is Able to Pay A Retainer?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 335 (1959). By
the late nineteenth century the contingency fee was a common form of fee arrangement for
many matters. By the mid-1960s all fifty American states recognized the validity of the con-
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The contingency fee attorney may have incentives, however, to engage in
behavior that has a negative impact on the justice system. And finally, the
potential for windfall earnings by attorneys has a decidedly negative impact
on the public perception of fairness in the justice system.
A casual examination of contingency fee arrangements suggests that
the attorney and client interests are highly aligned. The attorney has an in-
centive to maximize the plaintiffs litigation return. He has little obvious in-
centive for shirking or settling too low. He apparently has an incentive to
work hard to recover his costs and attain the expected return. Moreover, his
risk attitude should be closer to the client's than the risk attitudes of attorney
and client in the fixed fee or the hourly fee arrangement. 64 Hence, under this
logic, a contingency fee attorney can be expected to be an aggressive, hard-
working advocate, who is likely to seek a large return or seek a substantial
settlement without exposing the plaintiff to the risk of receiving zero.65
Oddly, the most widely accepted view of the contingency fee arrange-
ment is that it misaligns the interest of client and attorney.66 This approach
views the attorney as a wealth-maximizer who will exert less effort than a
plaintiff would choose to have exerted on his behalf because the attorney,
not the client, fronts the costs of such effort. Under this view, the contin-
gency fee arrangement produces shirking and sub-optimal investment in the
case. It is also thought to produce sub-optimal settlements because client
and attorney face differing cost constraints when they assess the alternatives
of settling or pursuing costly litigation. 67 Thus, there are competing views
tingent fee. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. Tit. 17-A, §516 (1983) (recognizing the contin-
gent fee as legal in the state of Maine).
64 See Danzon, supra note 24, at 223 ("[T]he contingent fee system induces the amount of
attorney effort that would be chosen by a fully informed risk-neutral plaintiff who was pay-
ing an attorney by the hour.").
65 See Miceli & Segerson, supra note 24, at 381-82.
66 See Brickman, supra note 8, at 32; Clermont & Currivan, supra note 8, at 532;
Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 8, at 543-46; Terry Thomason, Are Attorneys Paid What
They're Worth? Contingent Fees and the Settlement Process, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 191-93
(1991); Watts, supra note 27, at 169; Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort
Litigation, 88 Nw. L. REv. 469, 471 (1994).
67 See Miller, supra note 27, at 190. The settlement decision is a joint decision between
client and attorney. However, the attorney is likely to exert substantial influence due to his
superior experience and legal expertise. Hence, the attorney may have the ability to gain a
settlement in the attorney's favor - and not the plaintiffs - by persuading the plaintiff that
the settlement is the best that the plaintiff can obtain. See also Richard M. Bimholz, The Va-
lidity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 949, 955 (1990);
Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 8, at 545; Thomason, supra note 66, at 221-22 ("[A] con-
tingent-fee structure alters attorney incentives so as to create a conflict of interest between
the attorney and his or her clients.").
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of the effect of the contingency fee on the alignment of client and attorney
interest.68
The contingency fee arrangement provides financing 69 and risk-shifting
benefits70 for the client. The contingency fee attorney fronts the litigation
costs, which may or may not be payable solely out of the plaintiffs recov-
ery. As a result, the plaintiff faces little or no risk of losing the case. His
return is bounded from below by zero and the return is bounded from above
only by the need to share the return with the attorney. Most of the risk of
loss is shifted to the contingency fee attorney, in exchange for which she
shares in the benefits.7 '
The contingency fee system clearly increases client access to the jus-
tice system, as compared with the fixed or hourly fee systems. By accepting
68 A competing approach views the contingent fee attorney as a competitive firm, a small
business. See Danzon, supra note 24, at 215-16. While maximizing personal income may
make sense for a single case, it is a poor long-term strategy for a successful law practice. An
attorney must be known for investing effort and money in clients' cases in order to compete
effectively for cases with high net expected returns and he must differentiate his representa-
tion from that of the selfish, utility maximizing attorney. Therefore, establishing a reputation
as a provider of high quality legal representation is likely to be a more effective strategy for
attracting plaintiffs with cases that have high expected returns. In a competitive market, the
attorney establishes this reputation by investing effort and resources into cases so long as his
profits are non-negative. Under these conditions, the contingency fee attorney's case invest-
ment equals that of the optimal hourly fee outlay. See Danzon, supra note 24, at 216 (identi-
fying the mathematical conditions under which contingent fee attorney investment equals the
optimal investment). However, reality is not perfectly competitive and there are informa-
tional imperfection that may discourage attorneys from adopting a competitive strategy. The
contingency fee attorney may well have a strong incentive to perform as a personal utility-
maximizer in low stakes, low visibility cases. Thus, it is likely that plaintiffs receive both
strong and suboptimal representation in contingency fee arrangements depending on case
visibility and amount at stake. See Kritzer et al., supra note 24, at 267 (reporting empirical
evidence that contingent fee attorneys exert less effort than hourly fee attorneys in low stakes
cases, but equal or even exceed hourly fee effort in high stakes cases).
69 In addition to making a lawsuit possible for a person without the financial resources to
pay a lawyer, see Ross, supra note 22, at 12, the contingent fee also functions as a financial
hedge, whereby the exposure to loss is limited by the attorney's assumption of risk, and gain
is similarly limited by the attorney's sharing in equity. See Brickman, supra note 8, at 43.
70 Professor Kritzer observes that the attorney working on an hourly or fixed fee basis
normally expects payment in advance, in addition to expenses, whereas the financing ar-
rangement offered by the contingency fee attorney is a key feature of her service. Kritzer,
supra note 3, at 270.
71 See Miller, supra note 27, at 189 ("The attorney effectively purchases an equity interest
in the litigation from the plaintiff, offering his or her future services in exchange for a per-
centage of the recovery."). This percentage is regulated in many states. See BRICKMAN ET
AL., supra note 8, at 17 (stating that some states, including Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New
Jersey, California, Connecticut, and New York, regulate the contingent fee by imposing a
sliding scale). For a well reasoned argument that a contingent fee arrangement made in the
absence of a real risk of loss should be struck down as a breach of fiduciary duty, see gener-
ally Brickman, supra note 8. In practice, courts routinely strike down contingent fees that are
disproportionate to the risk involved in the litigation. Id. at 78-88.
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the financial risk of loss, the contingency fee attorney provides any plaintiff
with judicial access whose claim the attorney believes has a positive ex-
pected return.72 In addition, this risk-shifting characteristic of contingency
fee arrangements induces contingency fee attorneys to serve as society's ju-
dicial gatekeepers, so that unpromising cases are less likely to come to court
than under an hourly fee system.73
On the other hand, the contingency fee does not provide complete ac-
cess or ideal gatekeeping. Meritorious claims with important legal implica-
tions but limited pecuniary prospects will not be pursued under contingency
fee arrangements, either. In addition, the contingency fee attorney may
take a case with limited merits if he believes that he can extract a significant
settlement from the defendant. He may accept a "strike suit" with little fi-
nancial risk, especially in the United States where the loser normally does
not pay.75 This is a low risk strategy, because the attorney can drop the case
if the defendant refuses to settle. The association of strike suits with contin-
gency fee arrangements has precipitated demands for reform in the United
States76 and has made other western nations leery of permitting contingency
72 See Kritzer, supra note 3, at 307 ("In a sense, clients pay a premium for eased access to
the civil justice system.").
73 Contingency fee attorneys typically engage in this filtering activity in deciding which
cases to accept. See, e.g., Andrew Robert Schein, Attorneys Fees for Pro Se Plaintiffs Under
the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, 63 B.U.L. REv. 443, 455 (1983) (arguing that
contingency fee attorneys are reluctant to take FOIA and Privacy Act cases due to the diffi-
culty of evaluating the potential for success before accepting the case). This may result in
fewer frivolous lawsuits. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 8, at 586; Avery Katz, The
Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L Rav. L. & EcON. 3, 26
(1990).
74 Lawsuits to clarify legal rules, obtain equitable relief, or identify individual rights, for
example, usually are incompatible with a contingent fee arrangement.
75 Frivolous lawsuits obtained the moniker "strike suit" because of the unexpected and
explosive nature of the assault on companies whose stock drops unexpectedly. See Andrew
E. Serwer, What to do About Legal Blackmail, FORTUNE, November 15, 1993, at 136. Such
claims have been described as extortionate with widely volatile technology stocks seen as
particularly vulnerable to such actions. See Dan Morain, Anti-Litigation Initiative Drive
Moves Forward, L.A. TIMES, September 12, 1995, at A3. Corporate distress has encouraged
a push for litigation reform to restrict the ability of attorneys to bring such actions. However,
some commentators argue that such legislation is an over-reaction because there already ex-
ists effective means to deter the filing of frivolous claims. See, e.g., D. Brian Hufford, De-
terring Fraud vs. Avoiding the "Strike Suit": Reaching an Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK.
L. REV. 593, 594 (1995) (encouraging courts to use authority available under Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b) to prevent frivolous lawsuits before resorting to extreme reform measures such as cost
shifting).
76 Some attorneys, for example, target certain industries whose stock is particularly vola-
tile. For example, the regular wide swings in stock value of high technology companies
make them obvious targets for such actions. See, e.g., Gina Smith, In Silicon Valley, Nobody
Wants a Piece of Lerach: High Tech Execs Hope Nemesis Has Had His Day in Court, S.F.
EXAMINER, October 22, 1995, at D-1 (describing litigation reform efforts to deter attorneys
from bringing lawsuits against high technology companies); Nanette Bymes, Valley of the
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fee arrangements. 77 Hence, the access provided by the contingency fee ar-
rangement is accompanied by potential, and sometimes real, abuses.
In fact, the contingency fee is a prime suspect in the body of literature
that considers the wasteful effects of litigation driven by attorney interests
on the economy.78 The contingency fee arrangement is thought to impact
the judicial system by producing more litigation, 79 higher damages
awards, 0 and a greater expansion of legal doctrine by bringing novel theo-
ries of law to litigation. 81 We have considered that the contingency fee in-
creases access to the justice system, increasing the number of conflicts
litigated. It is also known that the vast majority of cases involving multi-
Pols: High Tech's Heavy Hitters Build a War Chest for Tort Reform, Bus. WK., August 28,
1995, at 72.
77 See I THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT 176-77 (1979) (ob-
serving that "[t]he fact that the lawyer has a direct personal interest in the outcome of the
case may lead to undesirable practices, including the construction of evidence, the improper
coaching of witnesses, the use of professional partisan expert witnesses ... improper exami-
nation and cross-examination, groundless legal arguments designed to lead the courts into
error and competitive touting").78 See Grant P. DuBois, Modify the Contingent Fee System, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1985, at 38;
Jay, supra note 8, at 813; Kritzer, supra note 3, at 267-8 ("On the one hand, contingency fees
represent the average person's "key to the courthouse. Individuals who would otherwise be
left with no recourse can pursue the compensation to which they are entitled. At the other
extreme, contingent fees are the source of all evil in the civil justice system: chasing ambu-
lances for clients, creating expectations that every little injury deserves large payments of
compensation, and filing inflated and fraudulent claims.") (footnotes omitted).79 See Walpin, supra note 2, at 654. The assumption that contingent fees promote litiga-
tion is well established in the common law doctrine of champerty, which forbade the attor-
ney's participation in the result of litigation. While contingent fees became established in the
United States by the mid to late nineteenth century, they continue to be prohibited in the
United Kingdom and Ireland on the ground of champerty. See Matthew Scully, Contingency
Fees: Another Name for Champerty?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1997, at A23 (discussing the
case of Buckle v. Fraser, in which an agreement of an attorney to secure a lost inheritance
for a client for a percentage of the amount recovered was struck by the Irish Supreme Court
because it "savored of champerty" and "could compromise the proper administration of jus-
tice"). In Buckle v. Fraser, [1996] 2 I.L.R.M. 34, the Irish Supreme Court held the agree-
ment was unethical because it "[had] an undue tendency to promote litigation for the benefit
of the promoter rather than the litigant or involves an abuse of legal proceedings." Professor
Miceli, however, concludes that the "results [of his economic model] do not generally sup-
port the conventional view that contingent fees promote excessive litigation" in the sense
that contingent fees do not provide the attorney an incentive to engage excessively in litiga-
tion. Thomas J. Miceli, Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 211, 224 (1994). This does not consider the impact of increased access to litigation
that the contingent fee permits for wealth-constrained plaintiffs. In short, it is probably the
financing feature of the contingent fee that increases litigation, not the incentive that the
contingent fee system provides to the attorney, as compared with hourly fee.
80 See Dover, supra note 26, at 551.
81 See J. Robert S. Prichard, A Systematic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of
Cost, Fee, and Financing Rules on the Development of Substantive Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
451,452-53 (1988).
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million-dollar awards and punitive damages involve contingency fee attor-
neys. 2 In fact, an overwhelmin majority of plaintiff tort claims are han-
dled on a contingency fee basis, 3 so an erroneous inference may be based
on a coincidental relationship. Nevertheless, the contingency fee provides
attorneys with incentives to aggressively pursue large court awards. The
possibility of sharing in large awards, as well as the psychological pitfalls
84 thof escalation and entrapment, provide the attorney incentives not only to
win cases, but also to punish the other side and maximize the inflicted pun-
ishment. In addition, the actions of defense attorneys, who usually work on
a hourly basis and have little incentive to settle and much incentive to delay
and conduct a war of attrition,15 undoubtedly fuels the contingency fee at-
torney's zeal and contributes to escalation of the conflict.
Finally, contingency fee arrangements hold the potential for apparent
windfall earnings by attorneys,16 and this negatively affects the public per-
ception of fairness in the justice system. 7 The attorney may appear to, and
82 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 526 (1986).
83 See Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort
System Outcomes Are Principally Determined by Lawyers'Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZo L.
REV. 1755, 1773-74 (1994) ("Virtually all personal injury litigation today is done on a con-
tingent fee basis.").
84 Escalation of commitment is a well-documented psychological phenomenon. See, e.g.,
Max H. Bazerman et al., Escalation of Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Mak-
ing, 33 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 141 (1984); JOEL BROCKNER & JEFFREY Z.
RUBIN, ENTRAPMENT IN ESCALATING CONFLICTS: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1985); ALLAN I. TEGER, Too MUCH INVESTED TO QUIT (1980). In his seminal study of es-
calating conflict, Teger found that the longer the conflict remained unresolved, the more
dominant psychological factors became in motivating involved parties. Id. at 24. Each side
tends to vilify the other and the desire to defeat and humiliate the other side eventually be-
come dominant objectives. See id.85 See Barker, supra note 45, at 201 ("Judges have experienced the frustrations of having
settlement discussions bog down or fail completely when the lawyer's ability to be paid is
tied to the amount of the final recovery to the client, and the lawyers have evaluated their in-
vestment in the case on the basis of hours spent.").
86 Professor Brickman has illuminated this point in several articles. See BRICKMAN ET.
AL., supra note 8, at 15; Brickman, supra note 83, at 1773-74 nn.57-60 (citing hourly rates of
return for contingent fee attorneys of $30,000-50,000 per hour); Brickman, supra note 8, at
2-3 (observing that from the perspective of a plaintiff seeking to sell a claim on a contingent
fee basis, "lawyers have been instrumental in creating a tort system which overcompensates
lawyers, undercompensates many claimants, and creates barriers to nonlawyer competition
in the claim-invoking process"). See also Gladstone, supra note 14, at 523 (observing the
problematic aspects of a "reasonableness" standard in court supervision of fees).
87 The sense of unfairness that the public may perceive has a psychological basis. Ac-
cording to equity theory, an individual's satisfaction with the results of a multi-person ven-
ture depends inversely on the difference between the partners' perceived respective returns
and inputs. WALSTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 17.
Professor Kritzer's study to date of effective hourly rates of return for attorneys suggests
thinking of the case mix as a portfolio in which fixed and hourly fee cases are low risk or
fixed income items and contingent fee cases are higher risk/ higher yield investments. Krit-
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indeed may actually, benefit disproportionately to the efforts and risk he in-
vests.8 8 State bar ethics committees,8 9 judicial decisions on attorney eth-
ics,90 and many commentators, 9' regard the contingency fee as ethical only
if it represents a shifting of a palpable risk from the client to the attorney.
Where there is no real risk of nonrecovery, the contingency fee is consid-
ered unethical.9 2
Of course, in theory clients may negotiate with attorneys to avoid
windfalls to the attorney; after all, in a perfectly competitive market for at-
torneys, expected attorney profits are zero. Except for large corporate cli-
ents, however, plaintiffs rarely negotiate alternative fee arrangements,
suggesting that there are other dynamics at work, such as the client's diffi-
zer, supra note 3, at 303 ("My analysis shows that lawyers who take a case on a contingency
fee basis can expect to do somewhat better than they do on their hourly fee cases .... The
occasional very good case will yield some significant profits over and above the balancing
out of the typical better than average cases and the worse than average cases. Under certain
circumstances, lawyers can do much better from contingency fee work than most lawyers do
from hourly fee work."). Like investors, contingent fee attorneys may have different ap-
proaches to managing risk. Id. at 304.
88 The apparent "windfall" fees of contingent fee attorneys in U.S. tobacco litigation pro-
vide an excellent example of this public perception. See Scully, supra note 23, at A18
(quoting Florida Circuit Court Judge Harold J. Cohen's declaration that $2.8 billion in fees,
amounting to 25% of Florida's $11.3 billion settlement, or $14,000 per hour per attorney for
42 months, "simply shocks the conscience of this court"); Bob Van Voris, 'Fees' is a Four-
Letter Word, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 1997, at A6 (concerning the fees to be awarded to private
attorneys in the multistate tobacco litigation settlement in 1997).
The potential for windfall profits, however, far transcends the tobacco litigation. See
Richard B. Schmitt, Courts Whittle Down Lawyers' Fat Contingent Fees, WALL ST. J., Jan.
28, 1998, at B-1 (describing various instances of contingent fee claims grossly dispropor-
tionate to effort expended, and also observing the power of the common law court to modify
and deny fee claims). See Andrea Gerlin, Patent Lawyers Forego Sure Fees on a Bet, WALL
ST. J., June 24, 1994, at B-I (patent attorney made $150 million a year in contingent fee
patent infringement cases).
89 See, e.g., Virginia State Bar Ass'n, [1992 Transfer Binder] Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics &
Prof. Resp. (UPA) LEO 1461 (Va:Ops. Apr. 13, 1992).
90 See e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672, 678-79 (Md. 1985)
("[W]here the risk of uncertainty of recovery is... low... it would be the rare case where
an attorney could properly resort to a contingency fee .... "); In re Swartz, P.2d 1236, 1244
(Ariz. 1984) (holding that an attorney who did not reduce his contingency fee upon finding
that there was no risk was in breach of an ethical duty); Cazares v. Saenz, 208 Cal. App. 3d
279, 288, 256 Cal. Rptr. 209, 214 (1989) ("[T]he raison d'etre for the contingent fee... [is]
the contingency.").
91 See BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 8, 10; Brickman, supra note 8, at 125-26; John
F. Grady, Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, LIG., Summer 1976, at 20, 24;
Horowitz, supra 3, at 177; Angela Wennihan, Let's Put the Contingency Back in the Contin-
gency Fee, 49 SMU L. REv. 1639, 1643 (1996).92 See WOLFRAM, supra 82, at 526.
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culty in prospectively distinguishing high quality legal representation93
from among the many competitors for contingency fee representation. The
complexity of the factors that affect the client's return probably inhibits
knowledgeable negotiation. There are many possible outcomes of a lawsuit,
and the particular characteristics of the attorney chosen can dramatically in-
fluence the size of the plaintiffs return. Choosing an expensive expert at-
torney in a case that the plaintiff is certain to win is rational. In particular,
retaining a high priced and distinguished attorney can have value if the at-
torney's reputation induces the defendant to settle quickly. Thus, a quick
settlement for a large amount is not proof that the attorney did not provide
substantial value to the plaintiff. Nevertheless, this argument probably is
not well appreciated in the public eye.9 4 Thus, the three types of fee ar-
rangements, based around the central elements of predictable fixed fees,
fees based on hours expended, and fees based on a sharing of risk of loss
and benefits, affect interests of the client and of the justice system in differ-
ent ways. If one thinks of these interests as a continuum of the duties an at-
torney owes to his client and to the judicial system, then it is clear that fee
systems emphasizing one element over others will encourage attorneys to
strike a balance of duties at different points on the continuum. The social
choice of fee systems, then, reflects a social preference for emphasis on dif-
ferent duties.
In the following section, we compare the effects of these types of fee
arrangements on each of the five interests we have identified. This compari-
son identifies more precisely the way in which each interest is advanced or
hindered by different fee structures.
V. COMPARING THE FEE ARRANGEMENTS
Each fee arrangement has both positive and negative aspects. Fee ar-
rangements sometimes vary in the same direction on similar dimensions,
and sometimes they diverge substantially. Fee arrangements diverge no-
ticeably, for example, in aligning attorneys and client interests. The fixed
fee arrangement particularly misaligns interests in that it provides strong
disincentives to working in clients' interests. Hourly and contingency fee
arrangements are far better at aligning attorney and client interests, but they
are not perfect.95 The hourly fee arrangement would be the fee arrangement
of choice for deep-pocketed plaintiffs in high stakes litigation. However, for
93 It is widely recognized that contingency fee attorneys who successfully differentiate
their services can obtain above average fees for their services. See DEREK BOK, THE COsT OF
TALENT 139-140 (1993) (decrying the phenomenon).
94 Professor Brickman has been a vocal critic of alleged attorney windfalls. Ignoring the
potential for attorneys to provide value in a case that settles quickly, or in which the risk of
no recovery is low, Professor Brickman asserts that such contingency in such cases are ethi-
cally valid. Brickman, supra note 8, at 32.95 See supra text accompanying notes 46-48, 61-65.
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other plaintiffs and cases the hourly fee attorney's insensitivity to costs and
risk makes the fee arrangement problematic; the attorney can spend more
than plaintiff receives in a winning effort unless the client monitors with a
high degree of insight, skill, and perspicacity. Contingency fee attorneys
also provide good representation in high stakes cases and do so with more
sensitivity to cost efficiency and risk.9 In low stakes cases the contingency
fee attorney is more likely to shirk.97 Hence, unless the case has a high ex-
pected return, the moderate income plaintiff is not well served by either fee
arrangement.
The fee arrangements also diverge dramatically with respect to client
risk of loss and costs. Both the fixed fee and the hourly fee arrangements
allocate substantial risk to the plaintiff, although the risk is more determi-
nistic with the fixed fee.98 The contingency fee arrangement shifts substan-
tial risk of costs and loss to the attorney but permits the plaintiff to share in
gains, including unexpectedly high gains.99 The contingency fee plaintiffs
downside risk, however, is zero - so long as there is no fee shifting to the
loser.'0°
The plaintiff's yield, or expected return net of attorney fees and costs,
provides a measure of the price of the reduction in risk. For high stakes
cases, contingency fee cases probably produce the lowest yields, because of
the high risk that attorneys bear and the financing costs. Yields under the
more risky fixed and hourly fee arrangements should be greater for high
stakes cases because fees depend on attorney costs rather than stakes. Al-
though costs and fees under these fee arrangements increase with costs, they
do not increase at the same rate as the attorney's share under the contin-
gency fee arrangement. In lower stakes cases yields may be lower under
fixed and hourly fee arrangements than under the less risky contingency fee
arrangement. This difference is due to the fact that fixed and hourly fee ar-
rangements are not as sensitive to stakes. Work done under a contingency
fee, being proportional to the stakes, can be scaled downward accordingly.
Therefore, the relative yield is likely to be greater when this fee arrange-
ment is used in low stakes cases.
96 A seminal study in the 1980s of hourly and contingency fee attorneys generally sup-
ports this assertion. See Kritzer et al., supra note 24, at 272-73 ("[O]ur analysis suggests that
even if contingency fee lawyers and hourly fee lawyers spend similar amounts of time on
cases, the factors that affect the allocation differ. Thus, contingency fee lawyers seem to be
more sensitive to the productivity of their time and are less influenced by purely craft-
oriented considerations. As the amount of money at stake in a case goes up, the contingency
fee lawyer seems to be willing to invest relatively more time in cases.").
97 Id. at 267 (discussing data that suggests contingency fee attorneys spend less on cases
worth $6000 or less than do hourly fee attorneys).
98 See supra text accompanying notes 46, 48-54.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
100 For a discussion of the implications of fee shifting, see infra text accompanying notes
132-138.
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Although the contingency fee arrangement would appear to provide the
greatest access to justice, this may not be the case where the stakes are low.
Low stakes cases, with low expected returns, may not entice the contin-
gency fee attorney to take cases, especially if he adopts a utility-
maximization strategy rather than a competitive strategy. Moreover, the
quality of contingency fee representation may be the lowest in low stakes
cases.
The fixed and hourly fee arrangements provide access to anyone will-
ing to pay the attorney's requested fee, and thus may provide superior ac-
cess to those who can pay the fee. Nevertheless, for a plaintiff who cannot
pay the fixed or hourly fee, even a claim with a million dollar expected re-
turn may go unrepresented. On the other hand, a marginal or malicious law-
suit - cases likely to be rejected by contingency fee attorneys - can be
represented if the plaintiff is willing and able to pay. Thus, all fee arrange-
ments limit access in some dimensions. The contingency fee arrangement is
likely to provide the greatest access but at the cost of quality representation
for marginal cases. Contingency fee arrangements discriminate based on the
case quality whereas the fixed and hourly fee arrangements discriminate
based on the plaintiffs ability to pay. The impact of each fee arrangement
on the justice system is not entirely clear. It seems reasonable to suggest
that whether his compensation depends on winning can influence the attor-
ney's ability to resist attempting to introduce error into the court's decision.
Fixed and hourly fee arrangements introduce no such incentive because the
attorney's payoff is independent of the court decision or settlement. How-
ever, contingency fee attorneys are susceptible to this pressure.
The perception of fairness in the justice system probably is affected
significantly by the fee arrangement. The hourly fee arrangement is most
likely to be perceived as fair because the fee is related to effort. The fixed
fee arrangement may be seen as fair because it is agreed to; shirking proba-
bly is not visible or well understood by the public. The contingency fee,
however, holds the possibility of multi-million dollar returns for seemingly
little work.
In short, the public policy of fee arrangements is a problem of judg-
ment and optimization. Ideally, a variety of attorney fee arrangements
would be available and clients and attorneys would match an optimal fee ar-
rangement with attorney-client characteristics and the nature of the case.
Such a system probably would result in fee arrangements biased toward
protecting the interests of the client and the attorney rather than those of the
justice system. At best, a fee arrangement might be optimal from the client's
point of view and not offensive to important interests of the justice system.
Protection of the interests of the justice system requires some regulatory as-
sertion of those interests in the decision process.
In the next three sections, we examine the dominant institutional fee
structures of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the western civil
law countries. In this examination, we apply the principles developed above
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and use them to draw inferences and suggest the likely direction of public
policy in the area of attorney fee structures in these countries.
VI. THE U.S. APPROACH To THE ATTORNEY FEE
In the United States, most civil cases in which money damages are
sought are undertaken through a contract with a private attorney or firm;
little legal aid is available for this type of legal proceeding. 10 1 In such cases,
attorneys and clients may contract within a range of possible fee arrange-
101 Most legal aid for civil actions in the United States is restricted to the poor. Funding
for legal aid is provided primarily through the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"), which
was created pursuant to the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88
Stat. 378 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1983)). Local government entities gen-
erally match these funds on less than a one-to-one basis. Private donations supplement this
public funding. See Robert J. Cohen & James Meeker, Don't Cut the Poor's Legal Lifeline;
Slashing Legal Services Corp. Would Deny Representation to 9,000 Residents, L.A. TIMES,
April 5, 1995, at B9.
The work of the LSC has received tepid support and, most recently, hostile treatment
from the U.S. government. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that there is no
constitutional right to legal representation in most civil cases. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102, 118 (1996); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S.
1, 7 (1989). In the absence of a constitutional mandate favoring representation, members of
Congress have threatened the existence of the LSC and substantially reduced its funding. See
Ragan Powers, Legal Services: Providing Access to Justice for All, SEATTLE TIMES, October
2, 1997, at B5. In part due to these cutbacks and the general lack of support for publicly
funded legal aid, a substantial majority of low and moderate income individuals who can
benefit from legal services do not receive it. See INSTITUTE FOR SURVEY RESEARCH AT
TEMPLE UNIV., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES & THE PUBLIC
FINDINGS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 20 (1994) (estimating that 61 percent
of moderate-income people and 71 percent of low-income people who can benefit from legal
services do not consider using a lawyer).
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ments,10 2 including the fixed fee, the hourly fee, and the contingency fee, as
well as creative combinations of these fee arrangements.' °
The fixed fee is a common fee arrangement in many kinds of legal
matters.10 4 In the fixed fee arrangement, the attorney takes no proprietary or
equity interest in the client's case. The attorney receives a fixed dollar re-
turn regardless of the outcome of the case. Traditionally, the fixed fee was
used to engage an attorney for a specific and limited representation. It is be-
coming more common, however, for law firms to enter into relational con-
tracts with a client rather than separate contracts for each transaction. Some
firms, for example, undertake a broad range of services for a client for a flat
annual fee.
105
The hourly fee, however, is the traditional method by which attorneys
in the United States are compensated.10 6 The attorney keeps a log of hours
worked on a transaction for a client and periodically presents a bill for the
102 In the United States, bar rules emphasize communication about the fee arrangement
with the client. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(b) (stating that
"[w]hen the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall
be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after
commencing the representation"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 cmt. I
(providing that it is sufficient "to state that the basic rate as an hourly charge or a fixed
amount or an estimated amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken into account in
finally fixing the fee"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 cmt. 3 (provid-
ing that "[w]hen there is doubt whether a contingent fee is consistent with the client's best
interest, the lawyer should offer the client alternative bases for the fee and explain their im-
plications" and a simple memorandum or a copy of the attorney's fee schedule may provide
sufficient communication with the client). In addition, Model Rule 1.4(b) requires the attor-
ney to explain matters to the client sufficiently well that the client can make an informed de-
cision regarding the representation. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b).
The ABA also takes the position that a lawyer entering into a contingent fee agreement
should advise the client of "the availability of alternative fee arrangement." ABA Comm. On
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 389 (1994) (discussing contingent fees).
103 Recent innovations include the blended hourly rate, the combination of a lower hourly
fee and a contingent interest in outcome, the defense contingent fee, the fixed unit charge,
positive premium billing, incentive billing, negative premium billing, the retrospective fee,
and the dedicated attorney (whereby the client purchases the services of an attorney for a
fixed period of time). For discussion of these innovations, see generally Zoe Baird, A Cli-
ent's Experience With Implementing Value Billing, 77(4) JUDICATURE 198 (1994); Haig &
Caley, supra note 20; Kritzer, supra note 10, at 189 (reporting the increasing acceptance of
alternative and value-billing among inside and outside counsel in the United States);
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, at 655 n.163 (explaining blended value billing and the "re-
verse contingent fee"); Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Is Value Billing the Answer?: A Response to
The Individual Practitioner and Commercialism in the Profession, 45 S.C. L. REv. 991
(1994).104 See Baird, supra note 103. However, at some point the complexity and uncertainty of
a matter make the fixed fee unfeasible. See Litan & Salop, supra note 53, at 194-95.
105 See Kritzer, supra note 10, at 189.
106 For a history of the gradual establishment of the hourly fee in American legal practice,
see Ross, supra note 22, at 6-12.
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hours. Sometimes this fee is taken out of a pre-paid retainer account after
the client approves the periodic bill. °7 Different hourly fees are charged for
attorneys of different levels of experience and expertise, as well as for
paralegals and similar services.'0 8 It is common for both the billing attorney
and the paying client to scrutinize the hourly statements for accuracy and
value.
Finally, the contingency fee is widely used in the United States, par-
ticularly on the plaintiff's side in litigation. 0 9 Under a contingency fee the
client's obligation to pay the attorney depends upon the outcome of the en-
gagement. Normally, the fee will be paid out of an expected monetary
award, and typically the attorney takes,between 20% and 50% of the court
award."0 If the client loses the case, however, no fee is payable."' Within
107 The fixed fee is different from the retainer fee, with which it is sometimes confused.
Special retainers simply represent advanced payment for a service. The funds are held by the
attorney in escrow and drawn on as they are earned; this sort of retainer could be used in
conjunction with almost any fee arrangement. The general retainer, however, is a fee paid to
a lawyer, often annually, simply to secure the lawyer's availability. A hybrid form of agree-
ment may provide for advance payment of an annual retainer that is applied to the bill as the
attorney earns it (presumably on a fixed fee basis for sequential transactions, or on an hourly
fee basis), the remainder being retained by the attorney for her availability. See Lester
Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C. L. REv.
1, 5-6 (1993); Alexander K. McKinnon, Analytical Approaches to the Nonrefundable Re-
tainer, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 584 (1996).
lo8 See Leblanc v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., No. 90-1607V (Fed. Cl., filed
November 8, 1995) (holding that certain routine tasks must be billed at lower paralegal's
hourly rate rather than higher hourly rate for attorneys); J. E. M., How Profitable are Associ-
ates?, AM. LAW., Dec. 1995, at 8.
109 Increasingly, however, contingent fees are employed in tort defense. Margaret Cronin
Fisk, Corporate Firms Try Contingency, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 27, 1997, at Al (quoting Louis
Briskman, general counsel of Westinghouse Electric, "'[o]ur general focus is to move away
from the hourly billing cycle. We're looking for a relationship that aligns our interests with
the law firm's'). Contingency fees are employed at times in a broad variety of types of rep-
resentation, including shareholder derivative suits, patent cases, mergers and acquisitions,
securities cases, and lobbying. See Painter, supra note 3, at 626.
10 See FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.5(B)(I) (setting maximum
contingency fees betveen 15% and 40%, depending on the stage of litigation). The contin-
gency fee is commonly used in U.S. personal injury litigation. See JAMES S. KAKLIK &
NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 37 (1986) (about
95% of U.S personal injury cases are taken on contingency); WOLFRAM, supra note 82, at
526; Settling for Less, supra note 20, at 445. In addition to regulation by lawyers' ethics
codes, see supra note 15, the contingent fee is regulated piecemeal by statute. For example,
claims against the federal government are subject to limits on the proportion of recovery
awardable as a contingent fee. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1998)
(20% of settlements, 25% of judgments); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §3730(d)(1) (1998)
(15%/25%); 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(1) (1998) (veterans' benefits, 20%); 42 U.S.C. § 406
(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)&(II) (1998) (Social Security benefits, the lesser of 25% or $4000); 20
C.F.R.§ 404.1730 (1999) (Social Security disability, 25% cap).
'l1 The attorney fee may be based on net receipts, effectively shifting costs to the client.
In addition, the client may agree to be obligated to pay expenses if there is no recovery, but
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the constraints of state and federal law and bar rules, a variety of contin-
gency fee arrangements may be constructed 1n 2 Under American Bar Asso-
ciation Model Rules, it cannot be used in most family law matters and in
criminal cases. 1 3 In addition, the contingency fee attorney must communi-
cate with the client in an explicit and detailed manner about the details of
the fee arrangement.' 14
In short, the states of the United States regulate attorney fees, but they
permit a broad range of choice in fee arrangements, particularly where civil
plaintiffs engage private attorneys for representation. Until 1975, the mini-
in practice that does not appear to happen. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 8, at 532
n.3.
1 2 The judge in a U.S. court has the power to rule on the propriety and reasonableness of
the fees of attorneys in a matter before the court. See MACKINNON, supra note 14, at 23-24.
In addition, legislatures have asserted an interest in supervising the contingent fee arrange-
ment. See REPORT OF THE ABA COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1981),
Legal Background Notes. A variety of hybrids of contingent fee arrangements have been
crafted by both regulators and scholars, basically with the goal of approximating either a pri-
vately or socially optimal fee arrangements to account for incentives and risk. See Brickman,
supra note 8, at 36; Clermont & Currivan, supra note 8, at 532 (combining contingent hourly
fees with bonuses based on percentage of recovery); Miller, supra note 27, at 201 (describing
fee arrangements in which percentage varies with the stage of litigation); Leubsdorf, supra
note 22, at 475. See also Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook. J.)
(analyzing the appropriate use of an hourly fee or a contingent measure of attorney fee under
42 U.S.C. § 1988).
113 Both the Model Rules and the Model Code prohibit, or severely limit, the use of a
contingent fee in domestic relations matters. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.5(d)(1) (prohibiting contingent fees in divorce, alimony and support cases); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 ("Because of the human relationships in-
volved and the unique character of the proceedings, contingent fee arrangements in domestic
relations cases are rarely justified."). See also MACKINNON, supra note 14, at 45-53; Karsten,
supra note 63, at 248 (discussing the public policy constraints on the use of contingent fees
in family matters that were in place by the end of the 19th century, even as the contingency
fee itself became well-established); Comment, Professional Responsibility - Contingent
Fees in Domestic Relations Actions: Equal Freedom to Contract for the Domestic Relations
Bar, 62 N.C. L. REV. 381, 382 (1984); Comment, Contingent Fee Contracts: Contract Re-
lated to Divorce Action Upheld, 56 MINN. L. REv. 979, 980 (1972). In addition, the Model
Rules and the Model Code prohibit the use of a contingent fee for representing a defendant
in a criminal case. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(2); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (c). See generally, Karsten, supra at 64 (dis-
cussing the public policy constraints on the use of contingent fees in family matters that were
in place by the end of the 19th century, even as the contingency fee itself became well-
established.); Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498, 499 (1991).
114 For example, the contingency fee arrangement must be in writing. It must state how
the fee is to be determined, including how the fee varies if the case is settled, goes to trial, or
goes to appeal. In addition, the writing must explain whether and how such expenses of the
case are to be calculated. When the matter is concluded, the attorney must write the client a
statement describing the outcome of the matter and, if there was a recovery, explaining the




mum fee schedule, which amounts to minimum price fixing, was common
in the United States for the straightforward transactions for which a fixed
fee is practical, such as real estate transaction, wills, divorces, simple con-
tracts, and trusts. These minimum fee schedules were struck down on anti-
trust grounds in U.S. federal courts. 11 Since then, the amount of attorney's
fees in private cases is relatively unregulated, although several states have
set maximum percentages for contingency fee cases to avoid overreaching
by attorneys.1i If the attorney and client are relatively free to establish the
fee structure, one would expect them to select - depending on characteris-
tics of the case and the attorney and client - one that emphasizes the
alignment of their interests, the sharing of risk and costs, and client access
to the judicial system. One would not expect them to select a fee arrange-
ment with an eye toward the operational efficiency of the justice system or
the social perception of justice because neither client nor attorney has an
immediate interest in these latter concerns.
Most European countries limit more closely the ability of attorney and
client to negotiate a fee arrangement, and this is an important dimension in
which the U.S. and the western European legal systems and legal profes-
sions are different."17 The following section examines the innovative ap-
proaches that the United Kingdom is pioneering.
VII. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE CONDITIONAL FEE
British solicitors traditionally have been limited to a choice of either
the fixed fee" 8 or the hourly fee.1 9 Through a series of reforms in the early
115 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down the publication of mandatory minimum fee schedules by a county bar associa-
tion that were enforced by a state bar association as horizontal price-fixing violative of U.S.
federal antitrust law.
116 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-251(c) (1997) (sliding scale for personal injury, wrongful
death, and property damage actions); MICH. M.C.R. 8.121 (1997) (maximum one-third limit
for personal injury or wrongful death actions); N.J. COURT RULES 169 R. 1:21-7 (1997)
(sliding scale for tort suits); NY CLS Sup. CT. §§ 603.7(e), 691.20(e)(1998) (providing
choice between sliding scale and fixed rate for personal injury or wrongful death suits).
Other states have enacted limits on contingent fee payments associated with medical mal-
practice cases. These statutes take the form of a declining graduated payment scheme. See,
eg. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1114 (1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2691 (1996);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 601 (1997); Wis. STAT. § 655.013 (1995-1996).
17 See generally James Donovan and Gerard Britton, USA v. The Rest of the World -
Product Liability Law, LLOYDS PRODUCT LIABILITY INT'L, Dec. 31, 1994, at (commenting
on such difference as the absence of punitive damage awards, contingent fees and jury trials,
the prevalence of an appointed professional judiciary, and the existence of caps on damages).
118 The fixed fee normally is negotiated with the client, or in the case of legal aid, with
the legal aid board. New proposals would identify cases involving less than £10,000 as suit-
able for a "fast track" procedure. Such cases would be undertaken on a standard fixed fee ba-
sis and would be subject to careful case management by the court. See LORD WOOLF,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, 20-58. See also Note, 'Access to Justice':
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1990S,120 however, Parliament has permitted the use of a conditional fee for
personal injury cases, insolvency proceedings, and proceedings before the
European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights.12 ' The conditional fee is available to solicitors, 22 and presumably to
barristers as well, 23 at least with respect to the uplift portion of the fee.' 4It
cannot be used if the case is funded through legal aid.
Lord Woolfs Interim Report, 14 Civ. JUST. Q. 231, 233 (1996); I.R. Scott, 'Access to Jus-
tice': Lord Woolf's Final Report, 15 Civ. JUST. Q. 273, 375-76 (1995).
119 Prior to the conditional fee, fee arrangements have been struck as unenforceable if the
solicitor agreed not to collect a fee if the case were lost. British Waterways Bd. v. Norman,
26 H.L.R. 232 (Q.B. 1993) (inferring that the fee must have been conditional on winning be-
cause the plaintiff prevailed against the Board, but was on income support and not legally
aided).
120 Section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990 [hereinafter "Act"] gave the
Lord Chancellor the authority to create regulations whereby conditional fees would be avail-
able for certain types of cases. Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, ch. 41 § 58 (Eng.). The
Act defines a conditional fee agreement as "an agreement in writing between a person pro-
viding advocacy or litigation services and his client which... (b) provides for that person's
fees and expenses, or any part of them, to be payable only in specified circumstances." Id. at
§ 58(1). Section 58 provides further that "[w]here a conditional fee agreement provides for
the amount of any fees to which it applies to be increased, in specified circumstances, above
the amount which would be payable if it were not a conditional fee agreement, it shall spec-
ify the 'percentage by which that amount is to be increased." Id. at § 58(2).
121 See Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, ch. 41 § 58(1) (Eng.) (excluding family pro-
ceedings); The Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995 (S.I. 1995, No. 1674) and Condi-
tional Fee Agreements Regulations 1995 (S.I. 1995, No. 1675) (including only proceedings
for personal injuries, insolvency, and actions before the European Courts). The conditional
fee system was proposed originally in the 1989 Green Papers under the Thatcher Govern-
ment. The WORK AND ORGANISATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1989) and CONTINGENCY
FEES (1989) both attempt to alter the structure of the legal professions and their fee systems.
See generally Maimon Schwarzchild, Class, National Character, and the Bar Reforms in
Britain: Will There Always be an England?, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 185, 220 (1994); Michael
Zander, The Thatcher Government's Onslaught on the Lawyers: Who Won? 24 INT'L LAW.
753,755 (1990).
122 Despite reforms of the early 1990s, the British legal profession remains essentially a
two-tiered system in which solicitors and barristers divide responsibilities of legal represen-
tation. Solicitors deal directly with clients and conduct research, handle routine business
planning and filings, and handle litigation in the lower courts, including the magistrates' and
county courts. Banisters are engaged to litigate and to handle courtroom representation in
the courts of general jurisdiction and the appellate courts. See Schwarzchild, supra note 120.
See generally, RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1988);
PATRICK ATIYAH & ROBERT SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
(1987).
123 In theory, at least, barristers have no contractual right to payment of a fee in any event.
See Schwarzchild, supra notel2l, at 203.




A. The Conditional Fee
The conditional fee is, in effect, an hourly fee that may include a pre-
mium for success. The solicitor charges the firm's normal hourly fee, which
need not be paid if the client loses the case. If the client wins the case, how-
ever, the solicitor may charge an "uplift" - sometimes called a "success
fee" - of up to 100% of the hourly fee. 125 The client and the attorney agree
in advance on the percentage of uplift, and presumably the extent of the up-
lift is inversely proportional to the likelihood of winning the case. While the
"uplift" cannot be tied to the damage award directly,1 6 the Law Society
recommends that it be no more than 25% of the damage award received by
the client.
2 7
The U.K. conditional fee is a variation on the long-standing "Scottish
rule" which permits a fee on a "no win, no pay" basis.128 The British ar-
rangement rewards success, but bases the reward on the effort expended
rather than on the amount in controversy. Prior to the passage of this rule in
1995 British courts were quick to strike down fee arrangements that pro-
vided a differential payment based on outcome as contrary to public pol-
icy. 2 9 Public policy still prohibits proportional contingency fees or a
125 See supra note Ill.
126 See Solicitors Act 1974, § 59(2) (Eng.) (reinforcing the traditional prohibition of a
contingent fee). A fee is considered "contingent," as opposed to "conditional" if it gives the
attorney a percentage return of the money damages or in other ways compensates the attor-
ney based on the amount received by the party by virtue of litigation. In addition, Rule 8 of
the Solicitors' Practice Rules of 1996 states that: "A solicitor who is retained or employed to
prosecute or defend any action, suit or other contentious proceeding shall not enter into any
arrangement to receive a contingent fee in respect of that proceeding." The Law Society pro-
poses to modify Rule 8 to permit an agreement by an attorney to waive the fee (whether
hourly or fixed) if the case is lost. See Rose, supra note 1, at 16. In that sort of arrangement,
an uplift would not be available and the ordinary fee would be contingent; it would not be a
percentage contingency fee. Id. The Law Society's action follows a decision of the Court of
Appeal in Thai Trading Co. v. Taylor, in which Lord Justice Millett said: "In my judgment,
there is nothing unlawful in a solicitor acting for a party to litigation to agree to forego all or
part of his fee if he loses, provided that he does not seek to recover more than his ordinary
profit costs and disbursements if he wins." Peter Hurst, The Indemnity Principle Following
Thai Trading Company v. Taylor, 148 NEW L.J. 405, 405 (1998).
127 The Law Society, which regulates solicitors, has promulgated a model fee agreement
according to which the uplift cannot exceed 25% of the damages. See YARROW, supra note
124, at 73. In a study of conditional fee cases, the Law Society's agreement was found to
have been used almost exclusively, either in its original copyrighted form or in a slightly
modified form. Id. at 72. In addition, the solicitor is obligated to explain to the client all
payment obligations that the client might incur, and to obtain the client's agreement to the
arrangement, and this occurs in 94% of conditional fee cases. Id at 81.
128 See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1990, ch. 40, § 36 (Scot.). See also
MICHAEL NAPIER & FIONA BOWDEN, CONDITIONAL FEES: A SURVIVAL GUIDE 2 (1996).
129 Arata Potato Co. Ltd. V. Taylor Joynson Garrett, 4 All E.R. 695 (Q.B. 1995) (finding
the agreement of a solicitor to reduce a fee by 20% if the case were lost to be a contingency
fee contrary to public policy, and therefore unenforceable). Prior to 1967 contingent agree-
ments for attorney fees were considered to constitute the crimes of champerty and mainte-
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pactum de quota litis in other matters. 30 The barrister, who is expected to
present all issues to the court in an impartial manner, and whose payment
would come from the solicitor in any event, may not enter into any but a
fixed fee arrangement.1
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nance. The Criminal Law Act of 1967 abolished the criminal aspect of these ancient prohi-
bitions, leaving them merely contrary to public policy: "The abolition of criminal and civil
liability under the law of England and Wales for maintenance and champerty shall not affect
any rule of that law as to the cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary to public
policy or otherwise illegal." Criminal Law Act, 1967, § 14(2) (Eng.).
For a discussion of contemporary concepts of champerty, see generally Adrian Walters, A
Modern Doctrine of Champerty?, 112 LAW. Q. REv. 560 (1996). While neither a crime nor a
civil offense, champerty can be used to undermine litigation funded by a stranger. See
Grovewood Holding Pic. v. James Capel & Co., Ltd. [1995]; Re Oasis Merchandising Serv-
ices Ltd. [1995] 2 B.C.L.C. 493; Re Ayala Holdings Ltd. [1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 469. Champerty
has roots in the thirteenth century, to prevent "support for disputants given by powerful pa-
trons" from spilling over "into private wars between feudal retinues." Walters, at 561.
The animus of champerty is complex and historic. See Giles v. Thompson, 3 All E.R.
321, at 350-51 (C.A. 1993) (Lord Mustill) (describing the history of champerty and mainte-
nance). Modem objections appear to include the need "to preserve the honour and honesty of
the profession" and to avoid conflicts of interest. Wallerstein v. Moir (No.2) 1 All E.R. 849,
860-61 & 872 (C.A. 1975) (Lord Buckley). In Wallerstein, Lord Buckley specifically con-
sidered the public policy against contingent fees, stating:
It can, I think, be summarized in two statements. First, in litigation as professional law-
yer's role is to advise his client with a clear eye and an unbiased judgment. Secondly, a
solicitor retained to conduct litigation is not merely the agent and adviser to his client, but
also an office of the court with a duty to the court to endure that his client's case, which
he must, of course, present and conduct with the utmost care of his client's interests, is
also presented and conducted with scrupulous fairness and integrity. A barrister owes
similar obligations. A legal adviser who acquires a personal financial interest in the out-
come of the litigation may obviously find himself in a situation in which that interest con-
flicts with those obligations.
Id. at 872. Professor Painter observes, poignantly, that the permissibility of the contingent
fee in the United States provides the American bar market power in the market for chain-
perty, inviting such competitive strategies as tying and price discrimination. Painter, supra
note 3.
13' This state of affairs is changing rapidly, however. See Lord Irvine of Lairg, Speech to
the Annual Conference of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (May 7, 1998)
<http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd/speeches/1998/1998fr.htm> (visited on August 15, 1999)
(stating, "[t]he majority of the British people are unable to uphold their rights and defend
their interests. The majority of the British people are effectively excluded from access to
justice," and arguing for expansion of the conditional fee system to include all private civil
matters except family law). The pactum de quota litis is a European civil law term that in-
cludes the concept of contingent payment. See infra p. 47.
131 Under the new conditional fee arrangement, however, barristers may be under pres-
sure to make their fee arrangements with solicitors conditional as well. The acceptability of
such an arrangement is uncertain; barristers, for example, may have less control over the
various elements of the case that affect its success, and may therefore be reluctant to take a
case on contingency in any event. See YARROW, supra note 124, at 76-77; Conning the IADC
Newsletters, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 463, 468 (1997). Under the Law Society model agreement,
the uplift of solicitor and barrister cannot exceed the cap of 25% of damages. See YARROW,
supra note 124, at 76.
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It is important to observe the impact of the "loser pays" rule, which is
part of the European tradition, 132 on the conditional fee. Customarily, courts
allocate the costs of litigation, including attorney fees, to the losing party.1
33
A solicitor winning a case under a conditional fee would be able to recover
his basic fee directly from the losing party, and that would not come out of
the damages paid to the client.134 Under the new conditional fee scheme, the
client would be responsible for the uplift. If the solicitor lost, he would not
receive a basic fee or a success fee. Normally, the client would be respon-
sible for the other side's attorney fee. 135 If the client were impecunious, and
the case simply taken on a conditional fee basis because the client could not
obtain support for it under legal aid, one of two things might happen: The
court might not shift costs to the impecunious losing client, as is common in
the case of legal aid cases. 136 Alternatively, the client may have purchased
insurance to cover the possibility of fee-shifting. The attorney would not be
liable for the winning side's cost either, 137 because in most cases either the
132 Insurance is available to cover fee shifting expenses related to personal injury litiga-
tion, see infra note 135.
133 Section 51(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 gives most English courts discretion to
allocate the costs of proceedings, and § 51(3) gives the court the "full power to determine by
whom and to what extent costs are to be paid." Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 51(1), §
51(3) (Eng.). Under Order 62, Rule 3(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, a court that
makes orders as to costs shall order that the costs "follow the event," so that the "loser" must
indemnify the "winner" for his costs in bringing an action or defending one. If there are sev-
eral losing parties, they are jointly and severally liable for the winner's costs, unless the
court allocates otherwise. See I.R. Scott, Towards Understanding the Maintainer's Liability
for Costs, 14 Civ. JUST. Q. 271, 272 n.3 (1995). Note the U.S. law proceeds from the same
first premise, that a court has the inherent power to determine the propriety of the attorney
fees in a case before it. MACKINNON, supra note 14, at 43 ("the general view in all jurisdic-
tions seems to be that this right to make fee contracts is limited by the basic power of the
courts to prevent unprofessional conduct by its officers").
134 See Conning the IADCNewletters, supra note 131, at 466.
135 Insurance schemes provide coverage for liability for the opposing party's costs. The
Law Society has worked with insurance companies to develop "Accident Line Protect" in-
surance for many types of cases, usually not including medical negligence and pharmaceuti-
cal and tobacco cases. See JOANNA SHAPLAND ET AL., AFFORDING CIVIL JUSTICE 47-50, Law
Society Research and Policy Planning Unit Research Study No. 20 (1998) [hereinafter
AFFORDING CIVIL JUSTICE]; Conning the IADC Newsletters, supra note 131, at 468. This
form of insurance is used in about 99% of conditional fee cases. See YARROW, supra note
124, at 78. Under the Law Society's procedures, a plaintiffs lawyer who is eligible to use
the Accident Line policy must do so in every personal injury case, the majority of which are
won or settled on favorable terms. Id. at 78-80. This holds the premiums to about £85 per
case. Id. See also Fiona Bawden, Improving Conditions, 94 LAW Soc'Y GUARDIAN GAZETTE,
Nov. 27, 1996, at 23; John C. Evans, England's New Conditional Fee Agreements: How Will
They Change Litigation?, 63 DEF. CouNs. J. 376, 381 (1996); Werner Pfennigstorf, The
European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 37, Winter 1994,
at 37.
136 See SHAPLAND ET AL., supra note 135, at 46.
137 The issue has been raised whether a solicitor on a conditional fee basis has sufficient
pecuniary interest in the case to become a real party in interest who might be liable for win-
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client or the attorney, or both, will have purchased legal cost insurance. In-
surance against fee shifting has become critically important to plaintiffs as
the conditional fee replaces legal aid cases.
13 8
It is also important to understand the relationship between the condi-
tional fee and the United Kingdom's relatively extensive provision of legal
representation through legal aid.139 At one time legal aid paid the attorney
fees for almost half of the serious civil litigation in England; this has been
scaled back significantly 140 with reduced state funding as the income level
for eligibility is lowered. 41 Under this system, the client and attorney apply
to legal aid for fees to pay the attorney. The case is examined on its merits,
based on a cost/benefit analysis, prior to coverage by legal aid. The legal
aid system usually pays solicitors a negotiated hourly fee that is usually
lower than the going rate.' 42 Costs normally are not allocated against a los-
ing party whose representation is supported through legal aid.' Thus, nei-
ther attorney nor client bears risk in prosecuting a case; the attorney is paid
without regard to the outcome of the case, and the client is not subject to the
ners' costs. In a recent Court of Appeals case, the court indicated that the conditional fee at-
torney has no greater exposure to fee shifting than a solicitor working under other fee sys-
tems. See Frances Gibb, Case Against Tobacco Firms May Fall Over Costs Ruling, TIMES
(London), Oct. 16, 1997, at 8 (reporting on Hodgson v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., in which
counsel for 47 lung cancer victims sought an order to debar the tobacco companies from
seeking recovery of their costs from the law firm in the event of a loss).
138 See Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal
Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345 (1990) (suggesting that without
fee shifting to the attorney, the English rule results in fee shifting only for the victorious but
impecunious party, but not for the victorious but solvent party, when they are in opposition);
Marc S. Stein, The English Rule With Client-To-Lawyer Risk Shifting: A Speculative Ap-
praisal, 71 CHI.-KENT L. R v. 603, 603-02 (1995); Marc S. Stein, Is One-Way Fee Shifting
Fairer than Two-way Fee Shifing? 141 F.R.D. 351, 352 (1992). See generally Herbert M.
Kritzer, The English Rule: Searching for Winners in a Loser Pays System, A.B.A. J., Nov.
1992, at 54; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 139; Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theo-
retical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 55, 56 (1982).
'
39 See AFFORDING CIVIL JUSTICE supra note 135, at 45-46 (explaining how the legal aid
system works); Conning the IADC Newletters, supra note 13 1, at 466.
140 See Tamara Goriely, The Government's Legal Aid Reforms in REFORM OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 347-369.
141 In 1998 the maximum household income level for eligibility, adjusted for family size
and similar factors, was £7777 for most cases, and £8571 for personal injury cases. See Press
Release #57, Lord Chancellor's Department, (March 4, 1998) <http://www.open.gov.uk/
lcd> (visited on August 15, 1999). In 1993, approximately 12-14 million people were cut
from the national legal aid program; the escalating costs of the legal aid budget were de-
scribed by one barrister as "a ghastly black hole." See Lisa Stansky, Changing of the Guard,
A.B.A. J., June 1996, at 72-73.
142 See AFFORDING CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 135, at 45-46.
143 See Conning the IADC Newsletters, supra note 131, at 467.
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"loser pays" rule. Under the conditional fee statutes, cases involving legal
aid representation are excluded from conditional fee arrangements.
Not surprisingly, legal aid is viewed increasingly as unnecessary in
those types of cases where a solicitor might take the case on a conditional
basis.'44 In fact, the Lord Chancellor has proposed scrapping the legal aid
scheme for most civil disputes 145 and embracing the conditional fee system
for all civil claims for money or damages.
146
B. How the Conditional Fee Affects the Five Factors
The United Kingdom's conditional fee system represents a distinct hy-
brid of the three fee systems and requires a separate analysis. In particular,
we think it should be understood against the backdrop of the legal aid sys-
tem it is likely to substantially, if not completely, replace. In that context,
we think the conditional fee is likely to better align client and attorney in-
terests; that the nature of the client's risk is basically unchanged; that access
to justice should increase in cases not previously covered by legal aid; and
that operational justice probably is not much affected; and that the social
perception of the justice system could be affected negatively.
144 A recent study funded by The Law Society to examine the Lord Chancellor's propos-
als to substitute conditional fees for legal aid does not, however, concur, especially in the
case of personal injury litigation:
The Consultation Paper suggests that publicly funded support on legal services should
be concentrated towards helping people secure their basic nghts. Is not being able to cope
with the effects of injury a basic right?... 'Personal injury' or 'tort' is labeled as a dif-
ferent branch of law in the textbooks and in law firms from 'welfare law' or 'crime' or
'family.' It is still part of needed welfare provision....
AFFORDING CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 135, at 86.
145 See Access to Justice with Conditional Fees, supra note 1, at 3. See generally Dan
Bindman, Deep Concern Over Threat to Legal Aid, 94/38 LAw Soc'Y GUARDIAN GAZETTE I
(1997) (estimating a savings of about £800 million annually).
146 See Robert O'Connor, Blimey, What's LegalAid Coming To?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at
22 (describing the proposal by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg, to extend the con-
ditional fee system to all civil proceedings except family matters and to bar the use of legal
aid to fund claims for money damages). In addition, the Lord Chancellor's proposal would
increase the merits threshold for funding a civil case through legal aid. See Frances Gibb and
Nicholas Wood, Justice for the Middle Class in Law Reform, TIMES (London), October 4,
1997, at I. This system would be used in conjunction with fixed fees rather than variable or
conditional fees. It is unclear whether the "loser pays" rule would be scrapped or, if not,
whether the solicitor or the client would be responsible for the winner's costs. The changes
have been opposed by the Bar Council, the Law Society, and groups such as the National
Consumer Council on the ground that a rigid merit test, combined with the prospect of pay-
ing the winning parties costs if the case is lost, will effective deny access to justice to many
people. See O'Connor, supra, at 22. See also Frances Gibb, No Win, No Fee Justice Will Be
a Rip-Off Says Bar Chairman, TIMES (London), October 16, 1997, at 8 (quoting Robert
Owen, QC, Chairman of the Bar, "There is a very real danger of abuse. There is a conflict of
interest at the very heart of these conditional fee agreements which could lead to the public
being ripped off.").
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1. Alignment of Interests
Under legal aid, the attorney receives his fee without regard to success
or to the amount of damages awarded. For that reason alone the conditional
fee should provide somewhat better alignment of attorney and client inter-
ests. In addition, under legal aid the losing plaintiffs attorney's fee are put
to the taxing master and paid by the state; usually the amount is not con-
tested by the winning party and the attorney gets what he asks. If the attor-
ney wins, however, his fees are shifted to the losing party, who has a strong
incentive to contest them. Thus, an attorney might well be better off losing
than winning a legal aid case, a state of affairs damaging to any desired
alignment of attorney and client interests. 47
The conditional fee provides the incentive for the attorney to win the
case. Unless an uplift is negotiated, however, the incentive is blunted by a
"toggle-switch" effect: the attorney has an economic incentive only to win,
not to obtain damages for his client. Even if an uplift is negotiated, the at-
torney is provided an incentive to obtain damages sufficient only to cover
his uplift, and not to obtain full satisfaction for the client.14 This feature is
not entirely undesirable. The solicitor has no incentive to push for large
damage awards - awards that may exceed the client's full satisfaction -
that tend to raise the social cost of litigation. Obviously, the Law Society's
cap is absolutely essential; without it, the attorney's uplift can exceed his
client's award, a result that would severely damage the perception of fair-
ness of the conditional fee.
2. Risk of Losses and Costs
Under legal aid, the client, not the attorney, bears the very real risk of
not being compensated for a loss, but does not have to pay the costs of his
attorney or the winning side; the state bears that risk. The attorney bears no
risk of loss, since he is paid in any event. Under the conditional fee system,
the client's risk does not change, the attorney's risk increases, 149 and the
state's costs are eliminated. In many cases, the client will have to pay the
premium for insurance, but that must be paid whether the case is won or
lost. Thus, the move from legal aid to the conditional fee has minimal effect
on client risk of losing.
147 A practicing solicitor attending a seminar at the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies,
London, May 20, 1998, afforded us this insight.
148 We can hear the "solicitor's client's nightmare" conversation: "Congratulations Mr.
Smith-Jones. You have won your case. And, better still, the damages will just cover my fee.
You don't have to pay a farthing."
149 Not surprisingly, attorneys in the United Kingdom are keenly interested in under-
standing and managing this risk. See Jenny Levin, Solicitors Acting Speculatively and Pro
Bono, 15 Civ. JUST. Q. 44, 45-46 (1996).
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3. Access to Justice
At first blush, the effect on access to justice of moving from legal aid
to a conditional fee is positive. This is primarily true, however, for the cli-
ent whose case was not taken by legal aid, either because of budgetary con-
straints or because he was ineligible for legal aid. The capacity to shift the
funding mechanism to the lawyer through a conditional fee should provide
greater access for this group, for much the same reasons that shifting the
funding mechanism to the attorney through the contingency fee increases
access.'s It does not appear to much affect clients whose cases would have
been funded by legal aid.
On closer analysis, however, one can see possible negative effects on
access for this group. First, the conditional fee attorney, rather than a legal
aid board, determines which cases are brought. The legal aid board can
choose to fund high risk cases with high social merit that a lawyer would
not fund. Thus, a client with a high risk, high social merit case may experi-
ence a reduction in access unless some other fund for public interest litiga-
tion is created.' 5 1 In fact, it is unlikely that a private solicitor will choose to
fund any truly high risk cases, regardless of their social merit, since he does
not share proportionately in the gain from taking the risk, as a percentage
contingency fee attorney would. His compensation is tied to hours put into
the case (with or without the uplift), and not to result. In the absence of re-
ward, high risk is not economically justifiable and cases will not be taken
that might have been taken under legal aid or under a contingency fee sys-
tem.
4. Operational Efficiency of the Justice System
The effect of the conditional fee on operational justice is complex, but
is not of great magnitude. The fact that the attorney has an incentive to win
the case probably increases the likelihood that truth will be found and jus-
tice will prevail. In addition, the attorney under a conditional fee should be
reluctant to wastefully run up hours due to the risk from losing at trial, as he
might under legal aid, unless, of course, the case involves remarkably little
risk. In that event, the attorney should wish to prolong the proceedings as
long as possible, and then settle at an amount that covers his fee and uplift,
without running the risk of losing at trial. This negatively affects the opera-
tional efficiency of the justice system as well as the interests of the client.
50 See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
151 For this reason, the Lord Chancellor proposes a transition fee to fund cases that test a
novel legal argument, or that involve small sums but hold benefit for large numbers of simi-
larly situated plaintiff, or that involve nonmonetary judicial awards or redress injuries
against the environment or the public health. See Access to Justice with Conditional Fees,
supra note 1, at § 3.30-3.31; Scott, supra note 118, at 275.
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5. Social Perception of Justice
Finally, we suspect that the effect of the change from legal aid to the
conditional fee on the social perception of justice will be neutral in most
cases. The attorney's fee is not likely to be perceived as a windfall; because
it is based on an hourly fee, it is earned, and the amount of the uplift has
been agreed upon in advance by the client, who must, in any event, pay it.
This system may be regarded as more fair than a public subsidy of a losing
attorney.
One possible and serious problem lies in the nature of the hourly fee as
a basis for compensation. First, the client's obligation to the uplift is un-
known; the legal aid client did not have to contend with this uncertainty.
Second, the attorney in this fee system has the potential for yields that may
be regarded as unfair. One can picture a case in which the conditional
hourly fee attorney, knowing that his basic fee falls upon the losing party,
accumulates a bill - with or without an uplift - that exceeds 100% of the
client's judgment in the case. Such a result does not occur even in the con-
tingency fee arrangement, which is thought to provide the lowest yield for
plaintiffs. Yields of this nature are likely to be perceived not only as exces-
sive but also as highly wasteful.
C. Conclusions on the Conditional Fee
Although the movement to the conditional fee in the United Kingdom
is explained as a measure to increase access to justice, its strongest effects
probably lie elsewhere. The new fee system shifts access from public to
private funding, with little effect on the clients whose cases might have
been funded by legal aid but more significant effects on non-legal aid cli-
ents. The stronger effect of the change from legal aid and from the pure
hourly fee lies in improved alignment of attorney and client interests. That
alignment, however, is marred by the incentives provided to the attorney to
overinvest in time. We see some potential for damage to the public percep-
tion of justice in this model, but we think that potential is ameliorated to
some extent by the cap. Moreover, because there is no strong incentive for
the attorney to push for excessive damages, the conditional fee system is
unlikely to garner the criticism that the contingency fee suffers.
VIII. THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS
The western European civil law systems differ from the common law
systems in many important respects, and especially with respect to the role
of the judge and the attorney. Is The continental judge tends to play a more
152See Werner Pfenningstorf & Donald G. Gifford, THE LITIGATION PROCESS, A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIABILITY LAW AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES
AND THE UNITED STATES 81 (1991) (noting "great difference in the way the Bar is structured,
in the way lawyers operate, in the way their fees are determined, and in the level of the fees
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activist, "inquisitorial" role; there is less pre-trial discovery, especially as
compared with the U.S. system. Normally, juries are not used in civil cases,
and punitive damages are uncommon. The legal culture is more conserva-
tive, at least as compared with that of the United States.153 Moreover, many
of the western European countries have a variety of occupations that require
legal training, and that confer different privileges and functions, rather than
the unified bar of the U.S. model or the tiered system of the United King-
dom. 54 Like the common law lawyer, however, civil law attorneys repre-
sent the interests of the client, have obligations to the system of justice, and
they must manage to get paid for their services.' 55 Thus, there is a basis for
comparing fee arrangements, all the while recalling that there are important
differences.
A. The Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European
Community: The Code of Conduct for Lawyers
Beginning in the late 1970s, the European Community (EC) com-
menced harmonizing rules of conduct for lawyers and cross-border legal
practice.1 56 The Council of Europe has been slow to issue extensive direc-
.... [T]he differences reflect different philosophies of civil procedure and of the relative
role of court and counsel."); Jolowicz, supra note 38, at 198-210 (comparing the adversarial,
inquisitorial, and accusatorial approaches to court procedure and the role of the judge).
153 See supra Pfenningstorf & Gifford, supra note 152, at 81-82 (discussing the limited
role ofjuries in the civil law system); NIGEL G. FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 98
(1996) (comparing the culture of the German litigator with that of the common-law coun-
tries); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA. 108-10
(1996) (discussing the anomalous "entrepreneurial, lottery-style character of American liti-
gation").
154 See Philippe Fouchard, The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: France, 25 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 221, 232-37 (1993) (explaining the roles of the avocat, the notaire, and other
officers of the court in France); Javier Sans Roig, Spain, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A
COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS APPLICABLE TO THE CROSS-
BORDER PRACTICE OF LAW 126, 126 (Edwin Godfrey ed., 1995) [hereinafter LAW WITHOUT
FRONTIERS]; Madja Barazuitti, Italy, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS 94, 94 (explaining the
roles of notaries, avvocati, and procuratori in Italy).
155The Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Community § 1.1 (Preamble)
(1988) [hereinafter CCBE Code] recognizes this common function of lawyers, stating:
A lawyer's function ... lays on him a variety of legal and moral obligations ... to-
wards:
the client;
the courts and other authorities before whom the lawyer pleads his client's cause or acts
on his behalf;
the legal profession in general and each fellow member of it in particular; and
the public for whom the existence of a free and independent profession, bound together
by respect for rules made by the profession itself, is an essential means of safeguarding
human rights in the face of the power of the state and other interests in society.
CCBE § 1.1 (Preamble).
15 6 See Edwin Godfrey, The European Union, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS supra note
154 at 12, 14-17 (chronicling the 1974 decision of the European Court of Justice on the right
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lives on the legal ethics, however, preferring to look for consensus in the
Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community (also
known as the Comite Consultatifdes Barreaux Europeens, or CCBE). The
CCBE is the community-wide association of the bars and the law societies
of the EC member states. In 1988 the bars of twelve EC member states of
adopted a Common Code of Conduct for lawyers.15 7 An Explanatory
Memorandum and Commentary followed the Code in 1989.158 The Code
has been adopted into the national professional rules of the CCBE members
and also those of six European countries that were not then members of the
EC: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. 159 The
Code is intended to apply to the cross-border practice of law, but inevitably
it will have the effect of increased harmonization of legal ethics within the
EU. The Code's scope of applicability is quite broad, covering not only the
ethical conduct of a lawyer practicing in another jurisdiction, but also that
of a lawyer advising another lawyer on matters within the home jurisdic-
tion.1 60 In fact, apparently the drafters envisioned a legal ethics code that
would warrant worldwide adoption. 6'
of establishment of lawyers, the Council Directive of 1977 on identification of legal rules of
practices, and the Council Directive of 1988 on educational qualifications); Roger J. Goebel,
Lawyers in the European Community: Progress Toward Community-Wide Rights of Prac-
tice, in RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE 239 (Mary C.
Daly & Roger J. Goebel, eds., 1995).
... CCBE Code (1988). See generally, Roger J. Goebel, Lawyers in the European Com-
munity: Profess Towards Community-Wide Rights of Practice, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 556
(1991-92) (describing various effects and consequences of the Common Code of Conduct);
Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community's Legal Ethics Code Part I. An
Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1993); John Toulmin, A
Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics? 15 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 673 (1991-92).
The CCBE is not an institution of the European Community, but rather an official liaison to
Community institutions, a role somewhat analogous to the ABA.
158 Explanatory Memorandum and Commentary on the CCBE Code of Conduct for Law-
yers in the European Community. Id.
159 See Terry, supra note 157, at nn.42-44; Godfrey, supra note 156, at 22; John Toulmin,
A Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics?, in RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHIcs IN
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE 207, 208-210 (Mary C. Daly & Roger J. Goebel, eds.,
1994).
160 See Godfrey, supra note 156, at 22-23.
161 See Toulmin, supra note 159, at 208-210 ("The hope is to build on what has been
done and to develop a code of professional conduct that will apply to the cross-border ac-
tivities of lawyers from all countries which are signatories to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).... [T]he CCBE seeks with others to develop a uniform code of
conduct that could be adopted worldwide."). But see Godfrey, supra note 156, at 22 ("[I]t is
however perhaps somewhat optimistic to believe that these rules without amendment would
be acceptable in their entirety to the professions of countries with widely differing systems,
such as the USA.").
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Article 3.3 of the CCBE Code prohibits entering into a pactum de
quota litis, 62 which is defined as
[A]n agreement between a lawyer and his client entered into prior to the
final conclusion of a matter to which the client is a party, by virtue of
which the client undertakes to pay the lawyer a share of the result re-
gardless of whether this is represented by a sum of money or by any
other benefit achieved by the client upon the conclusion of the mat-
ter.
163
Under the Code, an attorney may, however, enter into an agreement
where the fee is in proportion to the value of the matter, so long as the state
or the bar under a fee schedule regulates the fee.' 4 In addition, the fee must
be fair and reasonable. 65 Thus, the code leaves room for a member nation
to establish a fee arrangement that carries some of the risk-shifting and
gain-sharing features of a contingency fee. Presumably, the conditional fee
arrangement in English law falls within this interpretation.
B. The Fee Systems of the Continental Civil Law Countries
The permissible fee arrangements of the continental CCBE members'
legal systems are quite diverse, but they can be grouped into the hourly fee
system and the fixed fee system, with high variability as to contractual free-
dom to establish the fee.
1. The Hourly Fee Arrangement
The hourly fee arrangement is the dominant fee system among the
continental systems. Sometimes the hourly fee is referenced to a fee sched-
ule, 66 but more commonly the lawyer is governed by a code that enumer-
ates the factors to be considered in establishing an hourly fee and that
subjects the lawyer to some test of reasonability. This is the usual practice
for the French avocat,'67 the Belgian avocat or advocaat, 16 the Swedish
162 CCBE § 3.3.1 states: "A lawyer shall not be entitled to make a pactum de quota litis."
See SERGE-PIERRE LAGUETTE, LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (trans.), COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1988) Chap. 4-43, Jan. 1991 [hereinafter CROSS BORDER
PRACTICE COMPENDIUM] (suggesting that the reasoning behind this CCBE provision is the
belief that an unregulated contingent fee agreement would likely be abused, resulting in an
increase in nonmeritorious claims and lawsuits).
163 CCBE § 3.3.2 (1989).
'64 CCBE § 3.3.3 (1989), states, "The pactum de quota litis does not include an agree-
ment that fees be charged in proportion to the value of a matter handled by a lawyer if this is
in accordance with an officially approved fee scale or under the control of the competent
authority having jurisdiction over the lawyer."
165 id.
6 SERGE-PIERRE LAGUETTE, LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 159-67 (1988).
167 Jacques Buhart, France, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 154, at 75.
168 Roel Nieuwdorp, Belgium, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 154, at 32.
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Advokat,169 the Danish advocat (for nonscheduled services), 170 the Irish so-
licitor,171 the Italian avvocati (for out of court services), 172 the Luxembour-
gian avocat,173 the Portuguese advogado,174 the Scottish solicitor, 175 and the
German Rechtsanwelt (for out-of-court work).176
2. Contingent Elements of the Fee Arrangement
The percentage contingency fee is not permitted in most of the conti-
nental legal systems,177 although this prohibition is overlooked in some cir-
cumstances.' 18 In addition, the French avocat may agree that, at the end of
the representation, an honoraire will be payable if the result is successful;
the honoraire is a premium for success. 179Similarly, the Italian avvocati
169 Per-Reik Hasselberg & Per Nyberg, Sweden, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note
154, at 143.




172 Id. at 19 (noting that hourly fee arrangements are more likely to be made in "interna-
tional" law firms).
'
73 Id. at 12.
'
74 Id. at 13.
175 Id. at 11.
176 NIGEL G. FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 98 (1996); Lawrence W. Schon-
brun, Attorney Billing Practices in Germany: An American Perspective, 4 INT'L LEGAL
PRAC. 120, 121 (1994) ("Apart from the limited area of fees in litigation, it appears that
BRAGO has simply been abandoned by most firms in favour of the hourly rate method
which allows the attorney to charge what one German practitioner described as 'Whatever
you can get the client to agree to'.").
177 See Pfennigstorf, supra note 135, at 59 and sources cited at 59 n.153. Some represen-
tative statutes prohibiting the pacta de quota litis include: Decret 27.11.1991, Articles 174 et
seq. and 245 (France); Secs. 7, 12, 17, 31 et seq. BRAGO (Germany); Estatuto da Ordem
dos Advogados, approved by the Decreto-Lei No. 84, 16th March 1984, Art. 66 (Portugal);
General Statute for the Legal Profession Art. 56 (Spain); BOARD OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION,
GUIDELINES ON CONDUCT OF ADVOCATES 25-31 §§ (Sweden).
Italy and the Netherlands appear to permit the use of contingency in fee setting to the ex-
tent it is in accordance with the CCBE Code of Conduct, see supra notes 101-110. The Civil
Code 1942, Article 2223 (Italy); THE NETHERLANDS ORDER OF ADVOCATES, GUIDE TO
CALCULATION OF THE ADVOCATE'S CHARGES (The Netherlands).
Greece and Finland permit contingent fees under some conditions. Legislative Decree
No. 3026/1954, Sections 91-192 (Greece) (permitting pactum de quota litis under certain re-
strictions); FINNISH BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES ON FEE CHARGING (Finland) (pacta de
quota litis are permitted if agreed to in advance with the client).
The contingent fee sometimes has been an issue in the international enforcement of U.S.
money judgments. See Joachim Zekoll, The Enforceability of American Money Judgments
Abroad: A Landmark Decision by the German Federal Court of Justice, 30 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 641, 672 n.57 and accompanying text (1992) (Germany).
178 Javier Sans Roig, Spain, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 154, at 131 (dis-
cussing Spanish labor cases which do not prohibit contingency fees).
179 Sheridan & Cameron, supra note 170, at 20.
Attorney Fee Arrangements
19:272 (1999)
can agree to receive an additional fee, or palmario if a representation is suc-
cessful. These practices appear to be similar to the "uplift" under English
and Welsh law. Like the "uplift", the honoraire and the palmario are not di-
rectly proportionate to the monetary value of the result. There is some evi-
dence that the contingent element of the "no win, no fee" system of English
and Welsh law is receiving favorable attention on the continent. 18 °
3. The Fixed Fee Set by Statute or by the Bar
Many of the continental legal systems prescribe a schedule of fees that
attorneys are bound, to varying extents, to charge for their services. At the
extreme, fees are set statutorily. For representing a client in civil matters,
for example, the German lawyer operates under the Bundesgebubrenord-
nung fur Rechtsanwalte of 26 July 1957 (BRAGO, or Federal Ordinance on
Fees for Lawyers). 181 The BRAGO sets forth detailed rules and schedules
of fees based upon the stages of representation completed and the amount in
controversy.1 82 In civil litigation, the BRAGO is followed strictly by the
courts. At the conclusion of litigation the court allocates the statutory fee, as
well as statutory court costs that are both substantial and based upon the
amount in controversy.1 83 An agreement to charge less than the BRAGO
scheduled value of the service is illegal and void. 184 Attorneys may agree
with the client to charge more than the BRAGO scheduled value, and that
agreement, which must be in writing, may consider the time spent by the
lawyer. Such a fee agreement requires substantial disclosure and justifica-
tion.185 In effect, the German lawyer represents clients at court under a fixed
fee arrangement and does not assume court costs or shifted fees.
180 Korteweg & Steams, supra note 6, at 10.
181 See CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 162; Carsten Eggers, Ger-
many, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 154, at 85-86; Gerfried Fischer, Recognition
and Enforcement of American Tort Judgments in Germany, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 199, 201
(1994).
182 See Dieter Leipold, Limiting Costs for Better Access to Justice: The German Ap-
proach in REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 265, 271-73; Volker G. Heinz,
Germany, in EC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 170, at 16. The amounts are calculated regres-
sively with greater amounts in controversy. See FOSTER, supra note 176, AT 99.
183 The BRAGO value is a form of social engineering designed to overcompensate attor-
neys dealing with higher stakes cases, and undercompensate them for lower stakes cases, the
assumption being that the more well-off members of society would thereby subsidize legal
services to the less well-off. See Schonbmn, supra note 176, at 121 ("[T]his governmental
regulation of prices has not withstood the forces of modem market economics where price
mechanisms for good as well as services are often indistinguishable.")
184 Sec. 177 II BRAGO [Federal Ordinance Pertaining to Lawyers]. See FOSTER, supra
note 176, at 98.185 See Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, 'Loser Pays' - Attorneys Fees in
England, Germany, N.Y.L. J., October 15, 1992, at 3 (negotiating lower fee is considered
unethical); CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM supra note 162, at 27 Germany.
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The more common approach, among systems that set fees, is a mini-
mum fee schedule for services set by the bar. Spanish attorneys, for exam-
ple, are expected to adhere to minimum fixed fee schedules established by
local bar associations for each area of legal practice.1 6 These bar schedules
vary somewhat in the factors that may be taken into consideration to in-
crease the fee from the fee schedule.'8 7 Similarly, the Italian bar association,
the Consiglio Nazionale Forenze, sets the tariffa forense, a complex mini-
mum and maximum allowable fee set for in-court and out-of-court work in
different areas of law by avvocati and procuratore. 188 Within these ranges
the client may negotiate a fee based on enumerated factors, such as the na-
ture and value of the case, the complexity and importance of the issues, the
result of the representation, and the benefits to the client. Avvocati may
charge fees above the allowable maximum if consent of the Ordine degli
Avvocati e Procuratori is obtained.8 9 The bar establishes fee schedules also
in Belgium,' 90 the Netherlands,' 9' Denmark, 192 Greece, 93 and Portugal,
94
although the schedules do not appear to be binding.
186 See Roig, supra note 178, at 130.
187 Ramon Mullerat, Spain, in EC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 170, at 21.
188 The Italian bar is divided into two categories: the procuratore, who provide technical
assistance in the courts, and avvocati, who advise clients on legal matters. Majda Barazzutti,
Italy, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 154, at 94, 94-97.
189 Id.
190 See Nieuwdorp, supra note 168, at 32. Members of the Belgian national bar are re-
quired to charge clients a fee appropriate to the "dignity of the profession." See Carl Bever-
nage, Belgium, in EC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 170, at 21, citing Judicial Code 1967 (art.
459). Cf. CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 162, at 27-28 Belgium.
191 The Dutch advocaat charges private clients by the hour, based on a standard hourly
fee set periodically by the Netherlands Bar Association. The resulting amount can be in-
creased or decreased based on the experience of the lawyer or other circumstances, but other
forms of fee arrangements are discouraged and are subject to a rule of reasonability. In the
event of a dispute over the fee, courts apply the bar calculation schedule. See Justus Voute,
The Netherlands, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 154, at 107; Willem A. Hoyng &
Francine M. Schlingmann, The Netherlands, in EC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 170, at 11-
12. See generally, CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 162, at 26-27 Nether-
lands; THE NETHERLANDS ORDER OF ADVOCATES, GUIDE TO THE CALCULATION OF THE
ADVOCATE'S CHARGES.
192 The Danish Bar Association publishes fee schedules for specific legal services, and
the attomey must justify deviation from them. See Christian Emmeluth & Michael Rekling,
Denmark, in EC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 170, at 10, citing Code of Legal Procedure, §
126.2; CRoss BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 162, at 21-22 Denmark;
GUIDELINES ON FEE CALCULATION ADOPTED BY THE DANISH LAW SOCIETY 1987.
193 The schedule of fees is advisory. See Yanos Gramatidis, Greece, in EC LEGAL
SYSTEMS, supra note 170, at 10; CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 162, 25-
26 Greece; Legislative Decree No. 3026/1954, secs. 91-192.
194 See Statuto da Ordem dos Advogados approved by the Decreto-Lei, No. 84, 16th
March, 1984, Art. 65. The fee schedule established by the local district bar is intended to




Attorneys in most continental legal systems are permitted to set a fee
for a service, subject to tests of reasonability and sometimes with enumer-
ated factors to consider. 195 The setting of a fixed fee for handling all of the
litigation of a large client for a year is becoming more common,196 a devel-
opment that parallels events in the United States. 1
C. The Future of the Minimum Fixed Fee
To the U.S. attorney, the use of minimum fee schedules promulgated
by the state or by the bar is an unusual feature of European legal systems.
Since the minimum fee schedule was struck down as an unreasonable re-
straint on competition under the federal antitrust laws,198 the amount of a
fixed fee in the United States has been essentially unregulated and subject
to price competition. One can infer from the continued use of minimum fee
schedules in western Europe' 99 that the EC nations exhibit less concern than
the United States for anticompetitiveness in the legal profession, including
the use of state machinery to support prices. This is consistent with obser-
vations about twentieth century European attitudes toward cartels 200 and the
role of the state in protecting the economic status of certain sectors of the
economy.201 To the European, this may be considered the price one must
pay for a bar that is not dominated by the interests of clients, but that con-
Portugal, in EC LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 170, at 13; CROSS BORDER PRACTICE
COMPENDIUM, supra note 162, at 31-32.
195 The Law Bar of Barcelona, for example, enumerates the factors as relevant to the set-
ting of a fee: I) Time employed; 2) Economic interest of the matter; 3) Relevance of the is-
sue for the client; 4) Time limits imposed on the lawyer due to the case; 5) The case's
particular degree of difficulty, taking into account the facts, people and documentation that
were available and its legal complexity. See Roig, supra note 178, at 130.
196 Nieuwdorp, supra note 168, at 32.
197 See supra text accompanying note 104-105
198 See supra text accompanying note 115.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 181-194. In fact, the CCBE expressly permits
minimum price fixing of attorney fees. CCBE CODE RULE 3.4.
200 See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:
PROTECTING PROMETHIUS 178-79 (1998) (describing the post World War II preference for
economic concentration, government controls on the economy, and macro-economic plan-
ning and stating that "[i]n this intellectual atmosphere it is not surprising that economists
seldom focused on the need to protect the process of competition").
201 Professor Gerber grounds the twentieth century European attitude in turn of the cen-
tury Austrian thought:
The competition law ideas developed in Austria at the turn of the twentieth century pro-
vided the seeds for the development of the European competition law tradition.... Eco-
nomic competition was valued, but subject to considerations of community welfare;
administrative decision-makers were considered competent to deal with the conflicts
arising from competing private and public goals; and the respect for law and its mecha-
nisms was sufficiently broad and deep to create confidence that neither businesses nor
bureaucrats would lightly flout community norms. European competition laws continue
to be based on this constellation of insights and values.
GERBER, supra note 200, at 67-68.
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siders the interests of society.2 2 There is evidence, however, that European
legal systems continue to alter their attitudes on competition law toward
freer markets, as antitrust concepts permeate the business regulatory envi-
ronrment,2 °3 and this may impact the legal profession as well.
We predict that use of a fixed fee reduces access to the judicial system
and increases client risk of loss. The misalignment of interests inherent in
the fixed fee arrangement will result in suboptimal representation and en-
courage quick low settlements. In addition, attorneys on a fixed fee will
tend to skimp on efforts, except in high stakes, high visibility cases where
such behavior, if detected, would be costly to reputation. A minimum fixed
fee schedule exacerbates the problems of access and risk, while a maximum
fixed fee would exacerbate the problem of shirking. A more competitive le-
gal environment almost certainly would increase access to justice, manage
client risk, and reduce shirking.
From a different perspective, however, the tolerance of minimum fee
schedules may also reflect a different way of balancing the lawyer's duty to
the justice system and the lawyer's duty to the client. Attitudes may vary
among legal systems about the extent to which interests of the client and the
attorney should be aligned. Agency theory suggests that it is efficient for
these interests to align; however, in the presence of dual agency relation-
ships, the question becomes more complex. The European systems reflect
an implicit underlying skepticism about the desirability of too close an
alignment of attorney and client interests, too much zealous representation,
and too much identification of the attorney with the cause and interest of the
client.
2 °4
Indeed, in all legal systems the attorney has duties to the justice system
as well as to the client. Too close an alignment with the client may com-
promise the attorney's sense of obligation to the justice system. Unbridled
competition and strong incentives to win are likely to have this effect.
202 See Pfennigstorf, supra note 135, at 78 (describing the "uneasy balance between free-
dom (reflecting the attorney's professional independence) and regulation (reflecting the mo-
nopoly of representation granted them by law").
203 Professor Gerber describes the renewed European interest in competition law in the
1990s, observing
a growing recognition throughout Europe of the importance of competition. The market
was becoming more fashionable, and this both justified and encouraged measures to pro-
tect it. To some extent this represented an ideological shift, particularly after 1989. It also
reflected, however, a growing awareness that the European economies needed reinvigo-
ration and that increased competition was the most likely means of increasing economic
vigor. This provided a direct impetus for strengthening competition law systems....
GERBER, supra note 200, at 402, 417-36.204 See Terry, supra note 157, at 48 (suggesting that the identity of the attorney as an in-
dependent and objective professional may be more important in the European legal systems
than in the United States and stating that "[a]ccording to this perspective, the lawyer, even
when acting in a representative capacity, remains an independent being, whose identity is not
collapsed into the identity of the client").
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Americans have become inured to a legal culture in which lawyers are ex-
pected to be zealous advocates of the interests of clients. The U.S. system
apparently trusts an aggressively adversarial system to sort truth and do
justice, and therefore attends to the alignment of attorney and client inter-
ests. The European attitude is less tolerant of such a process; it strikes a dif-
ferent balance point between the attorney's duty to society and the system
of justice and his alignment of interests with the client.2 °5 It prefers the at-
torney as a gatekeeper, as a moderator and presenter of the client's cause,
rather than an advocate whose interests are highly aligned with those of the
client, even if this is costly in terms of client access, client risk, and effi-
cient pricing of legal services.
D. Legal Aid and the Problem of Access to Justice
Legal aid is an important factor in the continental civil systems as well
as the common law system. The systems vary widely in the extent and na-
ture of legal aid, the manner in which it is structured and administered, and
the propensity of lawyers to participate. In the postwar period the "north-
ern" countries, especially the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the Nether-
lands, and to a lesser extent France, Germany, and Belgium, established
significant programs of legal aid as a means of providing access to justice,
while in the southern countries, such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal, legal aid
was scarce. In the 1990s the "northern" countries have tended to reduce ex-
penditures on legal aid as part of overall government cost containment.20 6
Nonetheless, the process of access to justice remains a strong and important
consideration in public policy toward justice.
In the European literature on the contingency fee and especially the
percentage contingency fee, one is struck by the criticism that this fee ar-
205 Professor Terry has drawn a similar inference from a broader comparison of the U.S.
model codes and the CCBE, concluding that
in the United States society thinks about the lawyer primarily as an agent of the client, on
who acts because of, and at the direction of, the client. In other words, the lawyer is a de-
rivative person, who duties flow from the client. In contrast the CCBE Code suggests a
perspective in which lawyers sometimes can be viewed as acting for themselves, as op-
posed to acting as the agents of, and at the direction of, clients. According to this per-
spective, the lawyer is sometimes perceived as an independent being who has rights and
duties which do not necessarily derive from the client.
Terry, supra note 157, at 51-52. See preamble to CCBE Code, supra note 155.
206 Erhard Blankenburg, Access to Justice and Alternatives to Courts: European Proce-
dural Justice Compared, 14 CIV. JUST. Q. 176, 176-77 (1995). See Fouchard, supra note 7,
at 244-45 (describing a 1991 French government study of legal aid, Conseil D'Etat, L'Aide
Juridique - Pour un Meilleur Acces au Droit et a la Justice, and observing that "[p]ublic
funds earmarked for legal aid in France are very meager: less than 400 million francs in
1989, corresponding to a contribution of seven francs per head yearly, as opposed to thirty
francs in Germany, thirty-four francs in the United States, and ninety-eight francs in Eng-
land").
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rangement promotes excessive litigation2°7 and reduces the attorney's inde-
pendence and judgment.208 Rarely, however, is a direct comparison made
with other methods of payment, which may also promote or limit litigation
and which may skew the manner in which the attorney exercises her inde-
pendence and judgment.
Forbidding the contingency fee reduces access to the legal system and
prevents the attorney from absorbing more of the risk of loss than other
systems would admit. But for its tradition of legal aid, one might infer that
access to the legal system is of less significance to Europeans than to
Americans. In fact, the continental systems vary significantly in the level of
legal aid they provide,20 9 and in the levels of litigation in the judicial sys-
tem, with little obvious correlation.210 They vary as well in the extent to
which legal expenses insurance is commonly purchased.211
Clearly, the United Kingdom's experiment with the conditional fee is
motivated by a concern for access.212 Indeed, it may be assumed that most
207 For example, in the Lord Chancellor's 1998 consultative paper on conditional fees,
Access to Justice with Conditional Fees, supra note 1, Lord Irvine emphasizes at several
points an aversion to excessive litigation, all the while recognizing the fine line between an
undesirable level of litigation and a desirable level of rights protection. Id. § 1.1 ("We do not
want to create a litigious society but one in which people respect one another's rights."); §
1.12 ("We do not want to import "ambulance chasing," or to encourage litigiousness.").
208 See UK: No win, No Fee, But it Won't Be a Free Ride, THE OBSERVER, Aug. 15, 1993
(Reuters) (quoting a well-known English libel solicitor who says that "[i]t's wrong for a
lawyer to have a proprietary interest in the outcome of a case. His first duty is to give his cli-
ent objective advice. There's a danger that he will look at the matter subjectively"); 1 ROYAL
COMMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT, supra note 77.
209 The Dutch Buros voor rechtshulp, for example, are an extensive network of walk-in
centers to provide first-line legal advice and make referrals. For an insightful study of these
centers, see Tamara Goriely, Legal Aid in the Netherlands: A View from England, 55 MOD.
L. REv. 803 (1992).
210 See Blankenburg, supra note 206, at 177 (analyzing modes of state-provided access to
justice, and observing, for example, "the Dutch pattern of court avoiding is even more
amazing in the light of its general legal aid infrastructure which grants every second private
household an entitlement to legal aid subsidies, provided by a combination of public legal
aid offices and ajudicare system for lawyer services").
211 See Rickman & Gray, supra note 11, at 320 (noting that approximately fifty percent of
German households and eight percent of Swedish households have legal expenses insur-
ance). Legal expenses insurance is the term used to describe the type of legal insurance one
might purchase as part of a general household and personal liability insurance plan, or that
might be included in one union benefits. It is different from the accident line protect insur-
ance that the English Law Society has developed for conditional fee cases in that the latter is
purchased after the legal conflict-has arisen. See id.212 See LORD WOOLF, supra note I. In addition to altering the fee structure, the English
justice system is undergoing many changes designed to improve efficiency and reduce delay
through case management. See Note, 'Access to Justice, supra note 109, at ; Practice and
Procedure, 15 Civ. JUST. Q. 272 (1996); Michael Zander, The WoolfReport: Forwards or
Backwards for the New Lord Chancellor, 16 Civ. JUST. Q. 208, 209 (1997); Dick Green-
slade, Objections to Woolf NEW L. J., Sept. 6, 1996, at 1293; Dick Greenslade, Objections to
Attorney Fee Arrangements
19:272 (1999)
European countries are wrestling in various ways with the issue of whether
access and justice for ordinary citizens should be a good provided at public
expense or one provided privately by permitting greater risk and rewards
for attorneys.
213
"Access" should not be regarded as though it were another term for
"more litigation" or at least more formal dispute resolution. We note as well
that issues of access may be addressed other than by manipulating the in-
centives of attorneys to take cases in the formal legal system. Legal aid is
only one alternative that has been used in most western legal systems. In
addition, state provision of informal dispute resolution mechanisms, some-
times without lawyers, results in more access and more disputes subject to
the state justice system.214 In both of these examples, the state subsidizes
access to justice, whether it is through the courts or through alternate dis-
pute resolution mechanisms.21 5
The contingency fee arrangement represents, in effect, a public deci-
sion to subsidize access by shifting risk and rewards to private attorneys.
The different attitudes of Americans and Europeans toward the contingency
fee arrangement may reflect the American penchant for utilizing the private
sector to secure public goods, and the traditional European preference for
public sector solutions. In fact, there is evidence that the introduction of the
conditional fee system is challenging traditional understandings of the
economy of lawyering in the United Kingdom.216 The movement from legal
aid to the conditional fee shifts the risk position of the lawyer from no risk
to substantial risk.2 17
Woolf, NEw L.J. Aug. 16, 1996, at 1252; Dick Greenslade, Objections to Woolf, NEw L.J.
Aug. 9, 1996, at 1215.
213 See, e.g., Miguel Martin Casals, Spanish Product Liability - The Likely Impact of the
New Act, LLOYDS PRODUCT LIABILITY INT'L (Feb 27, 1995) (Reuters) (suggesting that in the
absence of punitive damages, contingent fees should not produce windfall profits and would
effectively improve access to justice by inured persons); Lord Mackay, supra note 1, at 10.
214 See Note, 'Access to Justice', supra note 118, at 231 (the United Kingdom, on the
other hand, has been slow to adopt court-annexed forms of alternate dispute resolution, pre-
ferring to monitor the experience of the United States and the Commonwealth countries).
215 Blankenburg, supra note 206, at 188-89 (suggesting that assessing court fees that ac-
curately reflect costs, especially against business and government agencies, will more effec-
tively promote ADR use, reduce overall costs, and improve access).216 See KPMG Report, supra note 1.
217 See lain Goldrein, Conditional Fees: The Litigator's High Wire Act, NEwV L.J., Oct.
11, 1996, at 1456 ("The conditional fee agreement brings out the lawyer in each of us. Those
litigators who are able to make that analysis will be the winners in the new environment.
Those who are not sufficiently disciplined in that risk analysis will be those who fail to make
a profit."); Catherine J.B. Leech, Towards a US System for Personal Injury Cases?, NEW
L.J., Dec. 6, 1996, at 1774 (stating that in the absence of jury awarded damages "[t]here may
not be the incentive for lawyers in this jurisdiction to take the large risks that US attorneys
take").
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
We began with the premise that a careful analysis of fee systems from
a framework that examined the lawyer's dual agency relationship to the cli-
ent and to the system of justice would yield insight into differences in both
practice and experience between the U.S. and western European legal sys-
tems. The analysis does, indeed, suggest several such insights that may hold
value as both the United States and western Europe consider possible
changes in their fee systems.
We have examined attorney fees from the standpoint of the dual sets of
duties that attorneys owe to clients and to society. The particular fee ar-
rangements permitted by society and used by clients will ameliorate or ex-
acerbate the tendency of the relevant interests to diverge at key decision
points. Any fee system will affect interests of the client in obtaining access
to justice, in trusting the attorney to protect client interests, and in allocating
the costs and risk of loss. It will affect the interests of the society in access
to the justice system, in the operational efficiency of the legal system and in
the extent to which the public views the justice system as fair and just in its
operation.
We have examined the predictable economic and behavioral effects of
different systems of compensating attorneys and used this analysis to draw
inferences about underlying differences between the U.S. and western
European legal systems. These differences are more than simply differences
of tradition and procedure. They reflect different assumptions about the de-
sirable level of access, the desirable balance of the attorney's duties to client
and to the justice system, and a preference for allocating the provision of
public goods to the public or the private sector.
The analysis suggests that the most striking differences are the United
States' strong preference for private provision of legal services and the
willingness to accept a close alignment between attorney and client inter-
ests. European countries are far more open to publicly providing some
baseline of legal services to its citizenry. Movements to more private means
of providing legal services, at least in the United Kingdom, appear to be
driven by efforts to address inefficiencies in public provision of legal serv-
ices rather than a change in preference in favor of private provision of legal
services.
Even with increasing privatization, there is still much concern about
how the balance between the attorney's allegiance to his client and to the
justice system is struck. In the United Kingdom a major concern is whether
allowing fee arrangements that closely align attorney and client interests
will induce attorneys to neglect their duty to the justice system. In Europe
the contingency fee is generally viewed as striking the balance too much in
favor of the client at the expense of the justice system. Hence, although dif-
ferent attorney compensation schemes are certain to become available in
Europe, it is very unlikely that the contingency fee will be considered an
option in countries that do not already allow it.
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The increasing globalization of legal practice will affect current reform
efforts.21 8 As the provision of legal service becomes truly international,
governments will experience considerable pressure to adopt codes and
regulations that facilitate global commerce. One likely manifestation of this
globalization will be pressure to adopt common procedural rules in order to
facilitate the ability of attorneys to counsel clients in different countries.
Restrictions on fee arrangements that are inefficient or noncompetitive are
unlikely to last. Although it is true that each country determines who can
engage in trial practice within its borders, the emergence of alternatives to
formal trial practice will increasingly nullify the importance of such juris-
dictional restrictions. Many disputes now are and increasingly will be ad-
dressed through arbitration, mediation, negotiation, and private trials.
Parties to disputes in countries that maintain overly restrictive controls over
fee arrangements increasingly will avail themselves of such alternatives,
rendering superfluous attempts by government to control trial practice.
The trend towards globalized legal practice also will pressure legal
systems that impede competition. It is unlikely that Germany's fee sched-
ules, Spain's minimum fee schedules, or similar regulations that restrict the
ability of attorneys to compete will survive. At the same time, common in-
terests in seeing that attorneys and clients meet their duties to justice, hon-
esty, fairness, and other values essential to the integrity of the judicial
system will remain prominent factors in determining allowable fee ar-
rangements. Without the integrity provided by such interests, judicial sys-
tems and the legal profession lack the legitimacy needed to maintain an
efficient market economy.
Hence, contingency fees are unlikely to become universally accepted,
nor will any fee arrangement that is perceived to align the interests of attor-
ney and client too closely. The movement to more competitive and private
means of funding litigation will invite fee arrangements, such as the United
Kingdom's conditional fee, that more closely align the interests of attorney
and client than do the fixed and hourly fees, without too closely aligning
such interests. This preference for maintaining some distance between at-
torney and client interests to avoid unacceptable conflicts with the attor-
ney's duty to the justice system will counter pressures to allow all
conceivable fee arrangements. Thus, while the landscape of available attor-
ney fee arrangements in Europe is almost certain to become less restrictive,
the benefits to legal systems of limiting attorneys' allegiance to clients' in-
terests will prevent European countries from loosening their regulatory hold
on attorneys to the extent allowed in the United States.
218 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
